This sudden transition from defence to attack was an example of the flexibility of the German military mind as well as a demonstration of the ability of the infantry and the panzer men. But the role of the Luftwaffe during those tense and difficult days and weeks must not be overlooked for it was crucial to the success of the Axis defence and counter-offensive. Indeed it is true to say that the Germans could not have survived the first days of the campaign without the active and vigorous support of the Luftwaffe in attacking, obstructing, and, in some cases, destroying the Allied spearheads. As an example of its activity, during the period from 20 November to 12 December, a daily average of 18 dive-bombing attacks and 25 missions by fighter and fighter-bomber was carried out. During the three days of the 10th Panzer Division counter-attack the number of missions flown was 54 and 108 respectively.

This short-lived superiority in the air enjoyed by the Germans was due in part to the fact that their bases at Tunis and Bizerta were all-weather airports and aircraft could and did operate from them when the Allied airfields were unusable. This all-weather facility and the close proximity of the aerodromes to the combat zone enabled the Luftwaffe to give complete cover and almost immediate support to the troops in the field as well as protection to the machines of transport command which were airlifting men and materials from Sicily. The achievement of that command was that it brought into the bridge­head areas during those first months no less than 7 battalions of infantry, whole batteries of field guns, 2 armoured reconnaissance companies, and at least 19 tanks, of which 4 were the giant Tiger Panzer VI.

German impressions on how the campaign was progressing are interesting for they show how clearly the men in the field anticipated the future turn of events. All ranks from Rommel and von Arnim down to subaltern officers realised that the Allies would seek to separate 5th Panzer Army from 1st German/Italian Panzer Army by an attack from one of the western passes through the mountains, and that the decisive blow would be delivered from the area of Medjez el Bab. It was apparent to all German commanders that Medjez el Bab held the key to the whole campaign and in order both to protect their own bridgehead as well as to deny this key point to the Allies, 5th Panzer Army proposed to seize the town in a pincer operation code-named Olivenernte, The time set for the opening of this offensive was the second half of January and the plan was that 334th Division would strike from the north and meet the pincer of 10th Panzer ascending from the south. To divert Allied attention and to gain important features, other German battalions would capture Djebel Mansour while Superga Division secured the Pichon heights.

To hide from the Allies the fact that 334th Division had left the line to prepare for the forthcoming assault, 'Chinese' attacks were launched in Djebel Chirich area and at other points along the Medjez sector. The Allies however were not inactive and an attack which was launched at Jefna on 6 January involved the German garrison in battles which swayed to and fro for nearly a week until 5th Para were sent in and restored the situation. Down in the deep southern half of the bridgehead the Superga Division, in position east of Djebel Chirich and west of Sbikha, was attacked by a French Corps which was now fighting alongside the Americans. The poor showing of the Italian soldiers in this sensitive area renewed the fear that they could no longer be trusted to defend themselves or their positions and that they could no longer be stationed in an area from which an Allied assault might strike to the sea. German counter-attacks recovered the ground which the Italians had lost but it was clear that given the shortage of infantry from which both Panzer armies were suffering, there could be no forces to undertake Olivenernte. Von Arnim therefore decided to strike at the weakest of the Allied armies and organised an offensive against the French Corps with the code-name Eilbote.

The 334th Division which had by now left the line was selected as the most suitable unit. It was moved by night drives in commandeered and requi­sitioned vehicles to a sector south-east of Pont du Fahs. The gap, which had been created by the removal of this division from the battle line, could only be plugged by shortening the line and a number of tactical withdrawals from mountain crests was undertaken and had been completed by 17 January.

Eilbote began on the following day and achieved immediate and important successes. The 334th Division captured the pass east of Djebel Mansour and the heights at Djebel Chirich while the motor cycle battalion of 10th Panzer Division seized Djebel bou Daboussa. The Allies moved back under this pressure and the whole Axis line moved forward to occupy the ground. British counter-attacks around Bou Arada began on 21st and for days there was bitter fighting for high ground but then the northern arm of the German assault, coming through the Chirich pass, linked with a mixed German/Italian group on Djebel bou Daboussa. This sector was now dominated by the Axis troops holding the high ground and the Allies withdrew from it on 24 January. But the strain of battle in the mountains and in the terrible weather began to tell upon the Axis troops who had fought for six days without rest or reinforce­ment, and they no longer had the determination or the strength to achieve new objectives. Eilbote was called off but the results were satisfactory: the high ground between Pichon and Pont du Fahs was in Axis hands, the immediate threat to the southern half of the Tunis bridgehead had been averted, and the French Corps had been badly hit.

Successful French counter-attacks against the Italians revived the fears that these would not stand their ground. When one particularly severe counter­attack around Djebel Chirich forced a German unit to fall back east of the gap the 5th Panzer Army commanders saw a chance to counter-attack, to outflank, and then to roll up the French line. They mounted a second Eilbote operation on 1 February. Tiger tanks of 501 Panzer Detachment, extra infantry, and increased artillery were posted to the assaulting units and, with this added strength, advances were made along the Pont du Fahs—Rebaa ad Yahia road. The French had by this time been reinforced with American equipment and men so that heavy fighting developed but the German forces went on to capture high ground on the right flank of the attack. There was less success on the inner left wing south of Djebel Chirich where the advance had to be made across open country dominated by American and French artillery of all calibres. Under the barrage of defensive fire the German attack in this area faltered and then halted. On the extreme left flank, however, Pichon fell to 47th Infantry Regiment and Ousseltia was captured by a storm troop detachment. Allied strength grew daily and the resistance which the Germans were meeting compelled them to break off the battle. The Axis wave receded as their troops gave ground and withdrew to strong defensive positions on the heights to the east of the Ousseltia valley.

The far southern extent of 5th Panzer Army's territory was an area in which there had been little fighting, for neither side had been strong enough to force a decision there, but in the second half of January, von Arnim at last had the opportunity to carry out an operation which would secure his links with Rommel's force. German positions to the east of the Faid pass, which had been lost in December, could be outflanked by any French debouchment aimed towards Sfax. Were this to happen then the rupture of the Axis front would have been brought about. As the other sectors of 5th Panzer Army front were relatively dormant there was an opportunity to carry out an operation against and to seize the Paid pass and to hold it as a barrier against the Allies.