Battle Group Liider was located some 3 miles north of the pass and Fischer armed it with a company of 20 tanks, 3 field guns, and a company of infantry. The task of this group was to block the road from the Chouigui pass. On the left flank of Battle Group Liider, was Battle Group Hudel, the strongest of the four battle groups. This had two companies of tanks under command, numbering perhaps 40 vehicles, two companies of anti-tank guns, and a company of infantry. The task of this force would be to destroy the Allied armour by enticing the tanks on to an anti-tank gun screen or by ambushing them. This group would move from the position it held about 5 miles to the north-east of the pass and would converge to form a wedge with the Liider Group. Together their task would be to attack Tebourba from the west or else to block the Gap at that place. The seven companies of Battle Group Koch's paratroops, together with three companies of infantry, a German and an Italian anti-tank gun company, and two field guns, as well as a bicycle platoon of para-engineers had a holding role and were to advance north-westwards towards the Gap cutting off the Allied forces from their escape route. The fourth and final battle group, Djedeida, was to act as a reserve for the first part of the attack. Once the Chouigui pass had been penetrated this group would press westwards, driving the British infantry from their positions on the ridges west of the village.

To carry out its part in the attack, the Battle Group had under command a company of paratroops, two companies of infantry, two anti-tank companies, 18 guns of 2cm calibre, a motor cycle engineer platoon, a battery of 35.5cm SP guns, 2 Panzer Ills, 2 Panzer VI’s, and several 8.8cm guns.

There was little time for adequate planning or accurate reconnaissance to be undertaken and to overcome the problems raised by the lack of signals equipment Fischer arranged for motor cycle couriers to bear messages. The Tiger tanks, too, presented difficulties for they had been sent only for testing under active service conditions and had, therefore, to be given to the battle group with the least difficult task - Medjeida Group. D-Day for the operation was 1 December and General Fischer expressed his intention of leading the attack in person.

Allied observers on the hills around the Chouigui pass would have seen in the bright light of a December morning, two columns of tanks heading towards them. As the panzer columns came within range they took up battle formation - in each case a shallow wedge, a tactic which allowed each gunner a good field of fire. The wide but shallow wave swept down upon the Allied tank forces at the mouth of the pass. At long range the panzer cannon openec fire and smoothly, efficiently, and destructively the German armour smashed at Blade Force overrunning some part of it and dispersing the remainder towards the Tebourba Gap.

A British counter-attack was certain to come in and in anticipation of tnis a troop of Panzer Ills was concealed under olive trees in one of the extensive orchards which dotted the area. From another olive grove the tanks of 17/21 st Lancers broke cover moving forward in a counter-thrust but as these passed the hidden Panzer Ills they were taken "in flank. Within minutes five of the Lancers' tanks had been destroyed. The others withdrew. The German infantry component was brought in personnel carriers more than halfway up one djebel — marked on the maps as Hill 104 — were quickly debussed, and then raced for the summit of the feature from which they fired upon the columns of Allied soft-skinned vehicles which were already being withdrawn through the Gap. The German tank wedge was thrusting strongly for the main road when it came under Allied artillery fire skilfully directed by British and American gunner observers. The Allied fire halted the Lu'der and Hudel Groups north of the road. The attack on that sector was stopped.

Fischer then changed the direction of his offensive and brought up the Djedeida Group, leading this into the assault in person. Shortly after 14:00hrs the giant Panzer VIs led the German armoured column westwards along the road to Tebourba. In the leading Tiger, Captain von Nolde searched the area ahead of his column for the American tanks which had been reported. There they were, some distance ahead heading down the road towards his group. The 16-foot long, 8.8cm gun on Nolde's tank swung, aimed, and fired. High velocity shells struck and destroyed the American vehicles blowing off turrets and tracks and 'brewing up' others. Nolde swung his Tiger off the road and entered one side of an olive orchard, through which he passed to emerge on the other side ready to intercept and to cut off the American tanks as they withdrew down the road towards Tebourba. The American armour had been engaged and defeated but there was still the British infantry holding the high ground - the ridge above Djedeida. It must be stated at this point that the German replacement battalions were of very low calibre and, in fact, their poor showing was the subject of bitter comment in Fischer's report of the battle. The German Grenadiers' attacks, although heavy, were not pushed home with vigour and determination and were driven off with heavy losses. It is, however, fair to record that Colonel Buerker, in his report on the battle, stated that the infantry had had no previous experi­ence of collaborating with tanks in an assault.

Now was the time for the troops of the southern pincer to come into action and small parties of Koch's men began to filter through the Allied defences making for high ground from which they would be able, at a later date, to fire with effect upon the retreating Allied columns. The short December day ended with a stalemate. To the north the early success against Blade Force armour had ended with the main thrust baulked and unable to move forward. To the east the important high ground was still in British hands but a tactical victory had been gained through the destruction of the American armour. To the south and south-west Koch's men were slipping their noose round the Allies, but the end was not yet in sight.

Both sides took the opportunity, during the night of 1/2 December, to improve their positions and to re-organise. New and fresh American armoured forces arrived in the area and relieved the shattered remnants of Blade Force. A small battle group from the Liider Group made a direct and vicious drive towards the Tebourba Gap but the attack faltered and died away in the Allied defensive fire. Then the German tactics changed; Fischer had decided upon a change of plan. He really had no need to move forward at all. If he could bleed the Allied tank strength then this would reduce its potency to a point where it would no longer be able to attain the objective of Tunis. All his battle groups needed to do were to weaken the Allies by continual assault and to confuse them by infiltration. Already there were signs that the Allied forces were becoming nervous as a result of the penetration of their lines by Koch's paratroops for these had, by now, almost completed the southern investment of Tebourba.

The situation on the Allied side was not as serious as the local commanders believed it to be. The Allied tank force was now grouped in and around the Tebourba area gathered into one compact mass, and, given the right leader­ship, might have driven the Germans back, for Fischer's men were not in a sound tactical situation. They were confined in a narrow area between Tebourba and the Gap and, therefore, subject to fire from all directions. Whichever way they turned to attack they could be fired at.[22] But the Allied tank commanders, and particularly those on the American side, had still not learned the basic lesson of armoured warfare — the use of mass and the need to conserve their machines by not wasting them in tank versus tank combats. The Allied tactic was still to engage in what were, in essence, cavalry charges and the first of a series of such assaults - isolated and unsupported - was launched against the Djedeida Group.