The sea-borne assault was betrayed to the Germans by local Arabs anc Nehring, with his forces committed to holding 78th Division's thrust, had nc reserve upon which he could immediately draw. The German troops were sc thin on the ground that only 30 men garrisoned Tunis town. Nehring's only solution was to use the men who were arriving by air. As the aircraft landec the soldiers were hastily embussed and taken to Cap Serrat, the area in which the commandoes had debarked. In the densely wooded hills, which are a feature of that coastal sector, the newly arrived German troops and the British elite troops fought desperate hide-and-seek battles in the darkness of the trees. Commando pressure pushed towards the Sidi Salah crossroads only IS miles west of Bizerta, but fresh German troops were flung into the battle anc the commandoes were compelled to re-embark.
The British para drop was also unlucky. The airfield objective was found to be abandoned and, in the absence of a relief force, the British paras preparec to make their way back to the Allied lines. But their move was intercepted by men of Koch's 1st Battalion as well as by the German armoured car reconnaissance company. Although they were harried, the British were not beaten and when the German paratroops, supported by tanks and armoured cars, made a frontal assault upon them, the British parachute troops destroyed the lead panzer. The Germans, riding into battle on the outside of the armoured vehicles, leaped off and formed action groups, moving forward under the protection of the armoured cars. In hand-to-hand fighting the British 'red devils' and the German 'green devils' of Koch's regiment fought a running battle which lasted until 2 December.
When the British battalion reached the safety of its own lines a count showed that it had sustained over 200 casualties.
As neither the paratroop drop nor the assault from the sea had achieved any reduction in the German opposition, General Evelegh ordered a temporary halt to allow his offensive to regain breath before making the final attack. But his hope of a pause was to be thwarted by the German offensive which was launched by the aggressive commander of 10th Panzer Division, General Fischer.
Although the British and the Americans had been carrying out plans to finish the campaign, it must not be assumed that the initiative had been only with the Allies. The Germans, too, had been very active. The greatest number of troops in their bridgeheads, particularly in the early weeks of the fighting, had been paratroops. These men were among the elite of the German forces and were capable, aggressive, and skilled. On the northern sector their idea of aggressive defence took the form of deep penetration into the Allied rear areas. Witzig's men had the task of delaying the advance of 36th Brigade and had decided that raids behind the British front and demolitions on the supply routes to the forward positions would have a greater effect than a straightforward blocking action. Night after night, often in pouring rain, the patrols went out slipping into the darkness to mine roads, to demolish bridges, and to intercept convoys of lorries, or even single vehicles well behind the British front line. But this was not enough for Witzig. Deep penetration to halt the convoys of supplies and reinforcements coming to Algeria would help to strangle the Allied supply routes and he increased the radius of his commando-type operations by para drops. In a short series of night jumps the German para-engineers landed far in the hinterland of the Allied armies demolishing and mining, causing confusion and alarm to the men on the ground and to their commanders alike.
The men of the para-engineers were all-round specialists and professionals. To cover the weakness in men and further to delay the Allied advance, they laid mine-fields covering every sensitive area, particularly the approaches to those defiles in the hills through which assaults must come. Because of the shortage of real mines many of the fields were sewn, either wholly or in part, with dummies and further to increase the difficulty of lifting them, sophisticated anti-handling devices were fitted.
It can now be appreciated that as a result of the build-up of troops, Nehring had been able to form a small infantry and panzer reserve. No longer was the military situation so desperate that it was the case of having to plug gaps with newly debarked troops. Now their placement and replacement could be carried out in a more regular manner than had been possible heretofore. With no real divisional organisation, for as yet no complete division had arrived in Tunisia, there was still a need for battle groups, those ad hoc formations, in the construction of use of which the Germans were masters. With this reserve of men and armour in hand, Nehring could make plans and he found himself faced with the choice of two very risky alternatives. Either he could use his new panzer force defensively, that is wait until the Allies were strong enough to beat him, or he could act aggressively and throw it against the Allied force around Tebourba, and risk losing it at the first throw.
His mind was made up for him by an order from Kesselring to carry out an attack. The Supreme Commander South was convinced that the Allies were still too weak to make their final thrust and was also critical of Nehring's precipitate retreat. An offensive was ordered to regain the ground which had been lost.
To command the troops in the forthcoming offensive Nehring chose Fischer, commander of 10th Panzer Division, whose unit's advanced party had arrived in Tunisia and who had taken over the responsibility for the defence of Tunis West. Due to Allied air raids the unloading of I Oth Panzer's vehicles took three days but by 30 November two panzer companies together with other troops, were in position around Protville ready to deal with any Allied thrust aimed at Tunis or Bizerta. The units which had arrived in Africa included 80 Panzer Ills from 7th Regiment and these were formed into two companies. In addition, two companies of a motor cycle battalion had arrived, followed by elements of an anti-tank battalion, one company of which had its 7.62cm guns mounted as SP. Among the essential vehicles which had not arrived were those of the divisional command. Fischer had to be content with a scout car without wireless as his command vehicle. The rest of his headquarters' group was mounted in motor cycle combinations.
Nehring's order to Fischer was simple and brief. 'You will attack and destroy the enemy troops in and around Tebourba', and in accordance with his instructions Fischer moved his command during the night of 30th to a point north-east of that small town and made ready for battle. Nehring then withdrew 5th Para from the line and posted it to El Bathan, south of Tebourba and gave Fischer units from other battle groups as well as four infantry replacement battalions. The 10th panzer commander realised that as he was weaker than his enemy he would have to defeat the Allies by cutting their retreat and stopping reinforcements from reaching them. These reinforcements and supplies had to come through two passes. The road from Medjez to Tebourba ran through one, the second pass being the Chougui, through which ran the road from Beja to Sidi Nsir.
If the Germans could capture these passes - and the lie of the land favoured them in this enterprise - they could block any attempt by the Allies to break the German ring and could then go on to defeat the enemy forces one by one.
Fischer's plan proposed an encirclement attack from three sides to pin the Allies against the river and the hills. The Allied positions were roughly triangular in shape with a mainly infantry force to the east and to the southeast. The armour belonging to Blade Force held the apex of the triangle at the Chouigui pass.