On 28 January, Commando Supremo, fearful of an attack to the sea by American forces which were being assembled in the Tebessa area and con­scious of a similar threat posed in the Gafsa area, ordered that an offensive be launched to seize and to hold the western passes,

Kesselring's orders to Rommel were to attack and destroy the American forward line and once the

United States forces had been driven back on Sbeitla and Feriana, then Sidi bou Zid could be taken and the Gafsa and Touzeur sectors could be seized. To carry out his part of the plan von Arnim's army, with two panzer divisions under command, would strike for Sidi bou Zid in an operation code-named Frithlingswind, while 1st German/Italian Panzer Army, in its operation Morgenluft, would drive to secure the west and the north-westerly flanks and then return its armoured units back to the Mareth front. The Luftwaffe Brigade would be used to garrison the captured areas.

There were deep and fundamental differences between Rommel and von Arnim as to their respective strategies for the forthcoming operations. Von Arnim, with his cautious approach considered that his task was to hold the bridgehead for the longest possible time and, not wishing to risk his forces, intended to launch only large-scale spoiling attacks. Rommel, with his greater flair for far-flung battles grasped the opportunities which such an operation presented.

By combining the Axis forces the western passes could be captured and then in a massive punch the Allied front could be smashed open. Through the breach would flood the armoured divisions aiming for Tebessa and then for Souk el Arba, deep behind the front of the Allies' 1st Army. Faced with this thrust in the back the Allies would have to give ground and withdraw to Algeria. The Axis bridgehead in Tunisia would, therefore, have been enlarged.

Von Arnim could not agree to Rommel's bold plan and both commanders appealed for Kesselring's decision. Mussolini's order, transmitted through Kesselring as Supreme Commander South, was a dilution of Rommel's plan for the objective was not to be towards Tebessa and Souk el Arba but towards Le Kef, a road junction immediately behind the Americans. Rommel argued that it would be at Le Kef that the Allied commander would have his strong reserve forces, and that, in any case, a successful advance upon Le Kef would achieve only a tactical and not a strategic victory, nor would it lead to a collapse of the Allied front in Tunisia, nor to the withdrawal of Allied forces which Rommel had planned.

Thus the die was cast. The two independent operations had as their in­tention the seizure of the western passes with Paid as the first objective and with this in Axis hands then the drive towards the Kasserine pass. Then would follow the attack against Gafsa and if this were successful then the sensitive south-western flank of the Tunisian bridgehead would have been secured, and the threat to the desert army holding the Mareth line would have been annulled.

The 10th Panzer, one of the two armoured divisions which von Arnim was to use in operation Fruhlingswind, moved through the streets of Tunis in the dark and cold days of early February and arrived in positions south-west of Kairouan. By now the men of the German panzer divisions had learned the need for correct camouflage and had dispersed their vehicles under nets among the cacti which grew profusely in the area. The infantry was dug in for better concealment in the sides of wadis which crossed the region and the division prepared itself for action. Ration and supply points were built for armoured actions, for particularly when these were fought at night, easily locatable dumps were required at which the tanks could refuel and rearm before returning to battle. It had become standard practice for extra drums of fuel to be carried on the outside of the tanks, despite the fire risk, to increase the length of time that the vehicle could stay in action. So that the tanks did not have to return for extra ammunition it had become usual for an additional box of armour piercing shells to be carried inside the tank.

In the workshops of each panzer company fitters carried out the final adjustments and minor repairs. Sand and dust which had clogged the air filters were cleared out. The dust which penetrated into every crack of the machinery reduced the life of the engine and the standard filters, originally fitted to the outside of the tank, had proved ineffective. These had, therefore, been enlarged and placed inside the vehicle. The increased life of the motor, which this refitting produced, was offset by the disadvantage that the interior of the machine was quickly covered with sand which affected the gun and its ammunition. Even the gun muzzle had to be fitted with a cloth to protect the

inside of the barrel from the scouring effect of the sand.

During the night of 10 February the division moved southwards to an area 25 miles east of Paid and the vehicles went, as matter of routine, into the olive groves which bordered the road. These orchards were ideal ambush positions for the trees were tall enough to hide a tank from the gaze of an enemy com­mander standing in his tank turret.

Reconnaissance on llth showed that there was no organised American opposition in the area around Paid. In the evening of 13 February the assault troops of 10th Panzer moved forward to the forming-up area, an olive grove eight miles east of Paid, where the attack orders were given out.

Ziegler, the commander of this operation and whose task it was to co­ordinate the assaults of the two panzer divisions, had already carried out his own personal reconnaissance and had drawn up his battle plan. The 10th Panzer was to form three battle groups and was to send two of these armoured forces through the Paid pass while the third remained in reserve. The non-motorised units of 21st Panzer which had been in position near Paid since the end of January would attack from the village under an artillery barrage and exit from the Rebaou pass to strike towards Sidi bou Zid. Meanwhile armoured elements of 21st Panzer would penetrate the Maizila pass and upon exiting would divide into two battle groups. The Schuette Group would advance northward to approach Sidi bou Zid from the south­west, while Stenkhoff Battle Group would move on Sidi bou Zid via the Bir el Hafey Road.

Shortly after I0th Panzer Division had arrived in its forming-up area, the General Officer Commanding issued his orders and laid down the com­position of the forces which would fight the battle. Reiman Battle Group would attack along the Faid-Sbeitla road and capture the Poste de Lessouda and for the assault it would have under command 2nd Battalion 86th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 5 Tiger tanks of 501st Tank Battalion, a platoon of the Panzer Engineer Battalion, an assault battery of 4 10.5cm guns, and 2 platoons of SP anti-tank guns.

Battle Group Gerhardt was to.thrust through the pass and then swing northwards to pass completely round the Djebel Lessouda and then to cut the Faid-Sbeitla road. The forces for this attack were 1st Battalion 7th Panzer Regiment, 2nd Battalion 69th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 2 platoons of the Panzer Engineer Battalion, 1 platoon of SP anti-tank guns, and a battery of 10.5cm guns. Battle Group Lang was in reserve.

During the night divisional engineers went in under the protection of the Italian troops, who held the high ground at the mouth of the pass, and cleared the mine-field just before zero hour. Shortly before 04.00hrs, just as the panzers were about to move forward into the attack, a sudden sandstorm swept the area and reduced vision forcing the engineers to hand-guide the tanks through the pass with lamps and hand torches. Despite the darkness which the sandstorm had intensified, the two assault groups from 10th Panzer made good speed.