St Valentine's day 1943 dawned and with it began the battle for Sidi bou Zid. The advance by Battle Group Gerhardt made good time in its swing round the Djebel Lessouda but as the light became stronger, heavy and accurate artillery fire was directed upon it from OPs positioned on the crest of the djebel. Immediately the tempo of the panzer drive was raised to pass behind the mountain and to attack the troublesome American guns. Quickly the panzer formation opened into attack grouping and formed a series of echelons. Behind the lead company came battalion headquarters with the lighter vehicles and the whole unit was so deployed that an attack on either flank could be met by the whole battalion pivoting to form a broad front. The panzer attack flowed forward, despite the United States artillery barrage, while behind the armoured spearhead the carriers of the Panzer Grenadier Battalion roared up the slopes of the djebel bringing the infantry to the nearest point from which the American positions could be assaulted.
As Battle Group Gerhardt swung south-westwards it intercepted a United States self-propelled artillery unit which was trying to escape from the advance of Battle Group Reiman. Desperately the United States column tried to make good its escape but the panzer point unit increased speed and began first to overhaul and then to outflank the Americans. In a panic some of the American vehicles were driven headlong into swampy ground and were cut off. The Gerhardt Group, having reached its first objective, the Faid-Sbeitla road, halted and took up all round positions ready to face the inevitable counter-attack.
Meanwhile Reimann Battle Group had emerged from the pass and had thrust towards the Poste de Lessouda engaging a vedette of two Stuart tanks which were hit and destroyed by the longer ranged 8.8cm guns of the Tiger tanks. Other United States tanks belonging to an artillery SP unit began to withdraw but were intercepted by Battle Group Gerhardt as described above. As the panzers reached the Poste de Lessouda, a radio report from a Luftwaffe aeroplane indicated that a strong force of American tanks was moving down upon the Poste in a counter-attack. Reimann Group went into 'hull down' position and as the Allied machines came into range they were picked off one after the other. Both battle groups then waited for the thrust by 21st Panzer to capture Sidi bou Zid but then received intelligence that bad going had delayed the unit's advance. In any case the success of 10th Panzer Division had made the thrusts by the battle groups of 21st Panzer redundant, but eventually Stenkhoff Battle Group, struggling through loose sand, reached the battlefield. Here it was able to intercept the United States tanks which had survived the assaults of 10th Panzer's battle groups and were advancing southwards. Stenkhof Group blocked the road, the only firm surface in that region, thereby forcing the American vehicles to struggle through the sand. It was an unequal contest. The German group with 2nd Battalion 5th Panzer Regiment 2 battalions of Panzer Grenadiers, and heavy artillery under command was not only numerically superior to the Americans, but the panzer guns had a longer range, and the whole force was under a central direction. Combat Command A of 1st United States Armoured Division lost that day 40 tanks and other material including 15 SPs and 2 personnel carriers.
By the afternoon of 14th, the situation was that the Americans had been driven from the battlefield. Reconnaissance detachments belonging to 10th Panzer Division had entered Sidi bou Zid and the main of the division was in position north-east of the village. Panzer Grenadiers were combing the area for American stragglers and combat engineers were destroying the American vehicles. Ziegler, confident of victory, began to arrange for the move of 21st Panzer Division, but the aggressive action of the American troops, cut off and isolated on the djebels but still full of fight, coupled with the certainty of a counter-attack by United States tank forces, delayed the transfer.
During the night the vehicles were serviced, refuelled, and re-armed and as more panzers from Africa Corps arrived in the area they, too, were put into position south of Sidi bou Zid. At first light a panzer company with grenadier support put in a dawn attack to clear the American infantry from the djebels while other detachments strengthened the defences of the village. By the time that the Americans began their counter-attack the whole area had been prepared for defence with field artillery supporting the anti-tank line. Positions were occupied both inside and ouiside the village and other panzer units took post on the flanks. The area across which the Americans would have to advance was a flat and open plain cut across with wadis. These steep-sided, deep, dried-up water courses were impassable to tanks except at certain points where the wadi walls were lower and the Germans sited their artillery to cover these crossing points.
It was nearing midday when the panzer reconnaissance detachment raised the alarm that dust clouds were to be seen and that an American tank column was advancing from the direction of Sbeitla. This was one battalion of Combat Command C whose intention was to destroy the German forces and to release the isolated United States troops. The German defence plan went into operation and panzers from both divisions moved into ambush positions, thrusting two encircling arms along the flanks of the American advance. Soon the Allied tank force had crossed the first of the wadis and, assembling on the far side of this, took up battle formation again and headed for the second water course. But, as the tanks began to break formation to look for crossing points, the battery of 8.8cm guns which had been waiting opened up and smashed the cohesion of the assault with accurately aimed barrages of armour piercing shot.
On the flanks of the American advance the panzers were also ready and waiting. At a command the whole German column turned inwards and to the barrage from the village was added the cannonade of the vehicles on the flanks. The American charge advancing as a deep formation of column of companies was struck and hurled back. Caught in a pocket of fire the survivors were struck again as they tried to carry out their orders. And even when at last the American attack recoiled there was still a gauntlet of shells to be run before they could reach the safety of their own lines. By twilight the battle had ended.
On 16 February a unit from 10th Panzer reconnoitred to a road junction some 14 miles north-west of Sidi bou Zid and joined forces with a second force of panzers on the Faid-Sbeitla road. The mission for 10th Panzer ended and in accord with the orders of 5th Panzer Army it swung northwards. The 21st Panzer continued the drive to Sbeitla, a key point in the defence of the Kasserine pass, for it was through this pass that Rommel intended to drive in his ambitious attack upon the rear of the 1st Army.
In the face of German pressure the Allied line swung back to positions along a mountain range, the western Dorsal, in the area of Pont du Fahs, and then evacuated Gafsa.
According to Liebenstein Rommel's plan to attack Gafsa had been turned down by Commando Supremo who wanted to maintain the boundaries between the two panzer armies along the 34th parallel, but when Liebenstein entered the town upon Rommel's order he found the place evacuated. The Allies had withdrawn so quickly that contact with them was lost and a reconnaissance unit had to be sent out to regain this. This armoured recce unit moved towards Feriano which was then captured by 17th. Rommel was now convinced that his original plan, with its deep thrusting blow into the Allied back, could succeed and he proposed to move upon Tebessa, but von Arnim did not agree for he considered that such an advance through the mountainous country in that region would consume too much of the little infantry strength which the armies had, to say nothing of the supply difficulties which an extension of the supply line would involve.