One advantage that the government enjoys in this situation is that the renminbi is a non-tradeable currency and therefore not subject to volatile movement or speculation. The government has hitherto resisted the temptation to liberalize the capital account and allow the renminbi to float, which would have the effect of enhancing the renminbi’s role, promoting China ’s financial position and making it easier for Chinese firms to invest abroad. The main downside with such a strategy is that the savings which have underpinned China’s huge level of investment might be undermined as savers go abroad in search of rates of return far in excess of the paltry levels they can find at home, thereby denying the country the funds for investment that it has hitherto enjoyed, with the inevitable consequence that the growth rate would decline. In addition, a floating renminbi would be vulnerable to the kind of speculative attack suffered by the Korean won, Thai baht and Indonesian rupiah in the Asian financial crisis. [463] Although Zhu Rongji, the then Chinese premier, intended to begin the liberalization of the capital account in 2000, the Asian financial crisis persuaded him that such a change would be imprudent. The present global financial turmoil only goes to confirm the wisdom of the Chinese leadership in continuing to regulate the capital account, despite persistent calls from the West to deregulate. In due course, a gradual liberalization could well be initiated, indeed there are already clear signs of this, but the Chinese government is aware that the existing system provides the economy with a crucial firewall, especially given its open character and consequent exposure to external events. [464]
Whatever the consequences of the global recession, there are powerful reasons for believing that the present growth model is unsustainable in the long run, and probably even in the medium term. Indeed, there has been a growing recognition amongst Chinese policy-makers and advisors that important modifications already need to be made to the model ushered in by Deng and intimately associated with his successor Jiang Zemin. [465] That process, championed by Hu Jintao, has already begun, with a shift away from the neo-liberal excesses of the nineties and towards a more harmonious society, echoing an older Confucian theme, with a new emphasis on egalitarianism, greater weight attached to social protection, a desire to lessen the importance of exports and increase that of domestic consumer spending, and a turn away from the influence of the United States — or ‘de-Americanization’, as it has become known. [466] Such changes are likely to be hastened by the global crisis and attempts to mitigate its effects.
Economic growth cannot depend upon a constantly rising proportion of GDP being devoted to investment, as is presently the case, because it would absorb an increasingly untenable proportion of the country’s resources, thereby imposing unsustainable pressures on consumption, for example. There needs to be a greater emphasis on the efficiency of capital and improving labour productivity, rather than an overwhelming dependence on investment, too much of which is wasteful: if not, economic growth will inevitably decline as the limits to higher and higher volumes of investment assert themselves. The ability to move up the technological ladder is fundamental to this. There is considerable evidence that this is already happening, with exports of cheap-end products like toys falling in the global recession and those of high-tech products rising. Similarly China will have to reduce its present level of exposure to foreign trade, which has made it highly vulner-able to cyclical movements in the global economy, as the global depression has shown. There is a danger too, especially in the context of a depression, that China ’s export drive will provoke a hostile reaction and moves towards protectionism. [467] Instead, it is already abundantly clear that China will have to attach greater weight to domestic consumption.
A growing problem is that the priority attached to breakneck economic growth above all else has resulted in China moving in a very short space of time from being a highly egalitarian society to becoming one of the most unequal in the world. [468] The causes of that inequality are threefold: the growing gulf between the coastal and interior provinces, with the richest province enjoying a per capita GDP ten times that of the poorest (compared with 8:1 in Brazil, for example); [469] between urban and rural areas; and between those in the formal economy and those dependent on informal economic activities. [470] This is leading to growing social tension — evident, for example, in the relationship between migrant workers and local residents in the cities — which threatens to undermine the cohesiveness of society and the broad consensus that has hitherto sustained the reform programme. [471] The government has already begun to pay much greater attention to promoting a more egalitarian approach, though so far with limited effect.
A key question here is the financial ability of the state to act in the ways that are needed. In the early reform period, decentralization was deliberately encouraged, with central revenue falling from 34 per cent of GDP in 1978 to a mere 6 per cent in 1995, according to the Chinese economist Hu Angang. [472] The state found itself increasingly shorn of many of its old sources of revenue and responsibility. [473] Expenditure by the central state, in its turn, came to account for a rapidly declining proportion of GDP: 31 per cent in 1978, reaching a trough of around 11 per cent in 1995. By the mid nineties there was deep concern about the loss of central state capacity that this involved, including the latter’s ability to promote balanced development between the regions, and a determined attempt was made to reverse the process. There were even fears that individual provinces were beginning to operate like independent countries, with an increase in their external trade and a decline in trade flows between them. [474] As a result, the government introduced major tax reforms including, for the first time, taxes specifically earmarked for central government; previously, central government was dependent on a share of the taxes raised in the provinces, based on a process of bargaining between the two. The central government also acquired its own tax-collecting capacity, with a large majority of revenue now being collected centrally, some of which is then redistributed to the provinces. [475] Not surprisingly, the rich provinces strongly resisted paying higher taxes to central government. [476] By 1999, however, state expenditure had risen to 14 per cent of GDP and by 2006 to around 22 per cent. [477] Crucially, the state needs to be able to fund its new social security programme in order to provide for the tens of millions of workers made redundant by the state-owned enterprises which had previously been responsible for virtually all of their employees’ social needs, including education, health and housing. [478] The problem is particularly severe with education and health, which have suffered from very serious public under-investment during the last decade, a cause of deep popular concern and resentment. [479] The government is deeply aware of these problems and in 2008 alone education expenditure was budgeted to rise by 45 per cent. [480] During the Maoist period, the state was responsible for almost 100 per cent of health expenditure: the figure is now around 16 per cent compared, for example, with about 44 per cent in the United States and over 70 per cent in Western Europe. As a result, a majority of the population can no longer afford healthcare. In April 2009 the government announced a major reform of the health system, including the short-term goal of providing basic insurance cover for 90 per cent of the population. The lack of a decent safety net and the threadbare character of key public goods fuel a sense of deep insecurity amongst many people, acting as a powerful incentive for them to save, even though the living standards of the vast majority, especially in the cities, have greatly improved. [481]
[464] Interview with Yu Yongding, Singapore, 3 March 2006; and Yu Yongding, ‘Opinions on Structure Reform and Exchange Rate Regimes’.
[466] Interview with Zhu Wenhui, Beijing, 20 November 2006; interview with Fang Ning, Beijing, 7 December 2005; and interview with Wang Hui, Beijing, 23 May 2006.
[470] Wang Zhengyi, ‘Conceptualising Economic Security and Governance’, pp. 531-4; Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? pp. 296–301.
[477] Nolan, China at the Crossroads, p. 30. Chinese tax revenues increased by 22 per cent in 2006 and by 20 per cent in 2005, which suggests that this process is continuing.