Certainly it cannot be their fault that false oper­ational ideas were taken up in the neighboring countries! (France increasingly became the excep­tion. It had effective tanks and, by the end of the 1930's, had started organizing armored divisions on the German pattern.)

  The First Three Panzerdivisionen

In spite of opposition from most quarters, the Kom-mando der Kraftfahrkampftruppen was given the assignment of organizing three large armored for­mations (PanzergroBverbande). This started in 1935 and was, to a certain extent, a large-scale experi­ment. The 2- Panzerdivision, then in Wurzburg, was turned over to (at that time) Oberst Guderian, one of the most ardent proponents of an operational Panzerwaffe. Many had the thought that, in this way, he himself would have to see the senselessness of such measures.

The path to these organizational measures had already been laid over the course of years of secret activity in the Reichswehr, part of which took place in the late 1920's in the Soviet Union (at the KAMA facility). On 1 November 1933 a training unit was formed at Zossen with the cover-name of "Kraftfahrlehrkommando" (motor vehicle training command). Within a few months, additional com­pany-sized formations were activated. Soon they were consolidated into battalions and regiments. In the rapid expansion after 1935, the accumulated experience paid off. The new German Panz­ertruppe could grow from within itself. It was imper­ative to avoid forming new units from untrained command personnel, as was done in other coun­tries. In Germany that principle is called "Kalben" (calving).

The decision to form separate armor forma­tions was not in itself a guarantee of future success. (Many countries had armor formations, after all.) In this connection it is important to note that from the beginning in Germany these formations were capa­ble of operations as combined arms teams. They did not need the external attachment of other forma­tions to do that. Among them were integral motor­ized riflemen (Schutzen) who were initially only transported on trucks. They soon developed into mechanized infantry (Panzerschutzen) and, in 1942, were given a special branch of service designa­tion (Waffengattung) as "Panzergrenadiere." The Panzerdivision included correspondingly motorized artillery (later the Panzerartillerie), combat engi­neers (Panzerpioniere) and signals troops (Panzer-nachrichtentruppen). Air defense against aircraft (Flak) was also soon motorized.

The heart of the new Panzerdivision was the Panzer-brigade and the Schutzenbrigade. The [33] Panzerbrigade originally included two Panzer-regimenter, each consisting of two Panzerabteilun-gen (corresponding to an American armored battalion) containing one medium and three light tank companies. The Schutzenbrigade originally contained a motorized Schutzenregiment, a battal­ion of Kradschutzen (riflemen on motorcycles) and a Panzer-Abwehr-Abteilung (antitank battalion). Divisional troops included a Panzeraufklarungs-abteilung {armored reconnaissance battalion), a motorized artillery battalion within the divisional artillery regiment, a Pionierbataillon and a Nach-richtenabteOung, as well as logistic formations. The inadequate production of tanks, especially the medium Panzer Ill's and IV's, prevented a uniform outfitting of the units. The concept of the Panzerdi-vision was not entirely proven, because three so-called "leichte Divisionen" (light divisions) were also formed. They only included a single Panzer-abteilung and, in the Polish campaign, proved to have inadequate striking power.

During the pre-war years, the tables of organiza­tion and equipment changed relatively often. It would pass beyond the intent of this book to go into the details. At the end of 1938 two additional Panz-erdivisionen and one more leichte Division were cre­ated. In April of 1939 another two Panzerdivisionen and another leichte Division followed. Starting at that point in time, only a single Panzerregiment was authorized in a Panzerdivision. The start of the war

came in the midst of these organizational measures so that the formation of the 6. through 9. Panzerdivi­sionen was postponed and two Panzerabteilungen were assigned directly to army districts.

  First Experience in War

In Poland and especially in France it became evi­dent that the brigade organization was too ponder­ous and the Panzerdivision had to be pared down. The unarmored riflemen were also not powerful enough. The armor-weak Leichte Divisionen were reorganized into Panzerdivisionen immediately after the Polish campaign. Henceforth the Panzer­divisionen included only a single Panzerregiment. With the arrival of the first Schutz-enpanzerwagen (SPW) (armored personnel carriers) the first rifle battalion of the Schutzenregiment was equipped with it and became the "gepanzertes Schutzen-bataillon" (armored infantry battalion), renamed "Panzergrenadier-bataillon" in 1942. The combat engineers were also given armored vehicles and the artillery and air defense forces received self-pro­pelled mounts (Selbstfahrlafetten).

  Armored Battle Groups or Kampfgruppen

As the war continued, antitank defenses increased and it became increasingly important to react more flexibly to developing situations. Large maneuver elements were often not in a position to do that. Combat-ready tanks (at times without concern for what company they belonged to) were assembled into a "gepanzerte Gruppe" (armored group) and reinforced with SPW-Kompanien (armored-person­nel carrier companies). These then formed so-called "Panzerkampfgruppen." Panzerpionier and artillery forces were generally assigned to support them. Depending on the situation, the Panzeraufk-larungsabteilung might also be involved. In this case, however, it was frequently employed more in the role of a (light) Panzergrenadierbataillon than for reconnaissance purposes. Divisions that had two Panzerabteilungen could also form two Kampfgrup-pen, though one of the battalions would have to work with a towed artillery battalion supporting it.

This combination of armored forces proved to be the most successful organization of troops. Only the "purebred" combination that was the Panzerkampfgruppe constituted a team of combined arms. It could work together in ideal fashion due to its armor and comparable operational and tactical mobility. None of the different branches had to exert undue concern for the other or employ it in a situation that endangered it.

The non-armored portion of the division served as the reserve, guarded areas or acted as normal positional troops in defense. That often caused logistical problems, since the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) usually had to be with the Panz-erkampfgruppe. Additional problems arose because no staff for the Kampfgruppe was permanently organized. Instead, it had to be formed by arbitrar­ily taking people from the parent organization. It would have been more proficient to have a perma­nent personnel organized for it. Armored battalions were also not given the logistical capacity to operate separately.

The organization and equipment of the Panzer-aufklarungsabteilung also did not prove successful. Rather, it left the regiments and battalions lacking their own efficient reconnaissance elements. As for the Panzerjagerabteilung was concerned, it was increasingly proposed to integrate it by companies into the infantry regiments or even into the Panzer-grenadierbataillone, since the antitank battalion was only suitable for limited separate employment anyway.

The Panzerkampfgruppe as an organization was not officially introduced during the war. Instead existing organizations were improved incrementally, such as by the formation of supply companies. Inad­equate to the end were the numbers and the outfit­ting of the Panzergrenadiere, the latter due to the lack of adequate production of SPW's. Most were only motorized and, in fact, really only infantry, since they had to perform all assignments dis­mounted.