During the siege of Tobruk, Rommel launched frequent costly attacks during the first month of the siege. The level of losses incurred caused Rommel to have several arguments with his unit commanders, and also with the German High Command. Indeed, some sources indicate that Chief of Staff Halder had to send Friedrich Paulus to Africa to rein Rommel in, although Rommel himself maintained he had realized the futility of further attacks on the fortress on his own accord.
Popular perception
Rommel was extraordinarily well known in his lifetime, not only by the German people, but also by his adversaries. Popular stories of his chivalry and tactical prowess earned him the respect of many opponents, including Claude Auchinleck, Winston Churchill, George S. Patton, and Bernard Montgomery. Rommel, for his part, was both complimentary and respectful of his foes. Hitler counted Rommel among his favourite generals. Rommel was among the few Axis commanders (others being Isoroku Yamamoto and Reinhard Heydrich) directly targeted for assassination by Allied planners. However, unlike the other two, the attempt on Rommel's life was a failure.
The Afrika Korps were never accused of any war crimes, and Rommel himself referred to the fighting in North Africa as Krieg ohne Hass—war without hate. Numerous examples exist of Rommel's chivalry towards Allied POWs, such as his defiance of Hitler's infamous Commando Order following the capture of Lt. Roy Woodridge and Lt. George Lane as part of Operation Fortitude. He also refused to comply with Hitler's order to execute Jewish POWs.
During Rommel's time in France, Hitler ordered him to deport the country's Jewish population; Rommel disobeyed. Several times he wrote letters protesting against the treatment of the Jews. When British Major Geoffrey Keyes was killed during a failed commando raid to kill or capture Rommel behind German lines, Rommel ordered him buried with full military honours. Also, during the construction of the Atlantic Wall, Rommel directed that French workers were not to be used as slaves, but were to be paid for their labour.
His military colleagues also played their part in perpetuating his legend. His former subordinate Kircheim, though privately critical of Rommel's performance, nonetheless explained: "thanks to propaganda, first by Goebbels, then by Montgomery, and finally, after he was poisoned (sic), by all former enemy powers, he has become a symbol of the best military traditions. ...Any public criticism of this legendary personality would damage the esteem in which the German soldier is held».
After the war, when Rommel's alleged involvement in the plot to kill Hitler became known, his stature was enhanced greatly among the former Allied nations. Rommel was often cited in Western sources as a general who, though a loyal German, was willing to stand up to Hitler. The release of the film The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel (1951) helped to further enhance his reputation as one of the most widely known and well-regarded leaders in the German Army. In 1970 a Lütjens-class destroyer was named the FGS Rommel in his honour.
Annexes Panzer Tactics
A everyone knows, theory and practice do not ilways coincide. That is exactly how it was with the German philosophy of the employment of armored formations in World War H. Although Germany was well ahead of all other armies in the fundamentals of commitment and in the art of operational command from the mid-thirties, within the Wehrmacht there were abundant violations of those fundamentals when it came to putting them into practice on the operational and tactical levels. Thus a study of German armored operations cannot have the goal of documenting the many violations of principle. Instead, I intend to make clear how the German fundamentals of employing armor formations differ from those of other nations even to the present day. Those tactically effective doctrines were one of the ultimate reasons for the success of German troops on a local level until the final weeks of the war.
The technical literature includes countless competent presentations at the level of operational/ strategic command (army and higher). That also holds true at the tactical/operational level of army corps and division. Totally underrepresented are factually correct descriptions of the level of command that bears the actual burden and rigor of the battle, that of the regiment—generally, the brigade in modern usage—'and the battalion. With appropriate reinforcements for combat and employment, they generally form the heart of the operation in that they become the battle groups (Kampfgruppen) or combat formations, frequently approaching divisional strength.
The reasons for the gaps in the literature are manifold. The interested reader usually wants an overview of a battle or a military theater without getting lost in the details of individual fighting. Also, most of the war literature inevitably comes from generals, some of whom have no knowledge at all regarding situations so far under them.
An additional aspect is that operational command in action at lower levels is, in part, more difficult than that of the larger formations, which an intelligent general staff officer can learn in a few years of ongoing training, regardless of what branch of service he belongs to. Command skills at the lower tactical level do not come from theoretical studies or sheer talent. One has to work long years at all levels to gain that experience. It was no accident that, by the end of the war, officers ranging from the level of divisional command to that of commanding general of an army corps were predominately men who had started the war as small-unit commanders and risen through command of small formations to command of large organizations. In the process, reserve officers were in the majority.
By using the classical weapon employed at the point of main effort (Schwerpunktwaffe)—the armor formation—I will familiarize the reader with the different types of operational roles and other missions that exist during operations.
Right at the beginning, an essential fundamental principle must be taken to heart: tanks achieve their success primarily and predominately through offensive action. That is true whether the tactical/ operational situation is offensive or defensive. As a commander of armies von Manstein masterfully demonstrated how German armor formations could achieve remarkable successes when they were committed in (counter-) attacks, even within the context of overall retreat.
The tank, therefore, must constantly remain the sword in the hand of the tactical commander. He must use it offensively against the enemy, even in hopeless situations. If he forgoes this advantage by committing tanks to stationary positions or, even worse, digs them in and allows them to degenerate into a direct-support weapon for the infantry, then he is like a knight of old who has been reduced to the dubious protection of his shield. The initiative an armor leader instinctively seeks then passes over to the enemy.
Misunderstandings regarding the combat value of tanks continually arose when they were assigned roles beyond their capabilities or which they could only perform in quite limited fashion. These misunderstandings arose when the tank was considered as the sole ruler of the battlefield. Such high-flown expectations in turn assume that the tank can withstand any threat, even though an abundance of such threats may be directed against it. In addition to direct-fire weapons of all calibers, there are indirect fire systems, mines, obstacles, close-quarters combat systems with hollow-charge or simple incendiary devices and an increasing number of missiles that can be used at minimal distances from cover by
individual riflemen. There is always great disillusionment when the tank formation, stressed beyond its capabilities, suffers hair-raising losses. It is hardly surprising to hear in many circles that the tank has become obsolete as an effective combat weapon.