Rommel was approached at his home by Wilhelm Burgdorf and Ernst Maisel, two generals from Hitler's headquarters, on 14 October 1944. Burgdorf informed him of the charges and offered him a choice: he could face the People's Court or choose to commit suicide quietly. In the former case, his staff would have been arrested and his family would suffer even before the all-but-certain conviction and execution. In the latter case, the government would assure his family full pension payments and a state funeral claiming he had died a hero. Burgdorf had brought a capsule of cyanide for the occasion. After a few minutes' thought alone, Rommel announced that he chose to end his own life and explained his decision to his wife and son. Carrying his field marshal's baton, Rommel went to Burgdorf's Opel, driven by SS Master Sergeant Heinrich Doose, and was driven out of the village. Doose walked away from the car leaving Rommel with Maisel. Five minutes later Burgdorf gestured to the two men to return to the car, and Doose noticed that Rommel was slumped over, after taking the cyanide pill. Doose, while sobbing, replaced Rommel's fallen cap on his head. Ten minutes later the group phoned Rommel's wife to inform her that Rommel was dead. [30]

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After the war, an edited version of his diary was published as The Rommel Papers. He is the only member of the Third Reich establishment to have a museum dedicated to him. His grave can be found in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm.

The official story of Rommel's death, as initially reported to the general public, stated that Rommel had either suffered a heart attack or succumbed to his injuries from the earlier strafing of his staff car. To further strengthen the story, Hitler ordered an official day of mourning in commemoration and Rommel was buried with full military honours. Hitler sent Field Marshal von Rundstedt as his representative at Rommel's funeral. Rommel had specified that no political paraphernalia were to be displayed on his corpse, but the Nazis made sure he was fully festooned with swastikas. The truth behind Rommel's death didn't come out until Fieldmarshal Keitel testified about it during the Nuremberg Trials.

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Erwin Rommel as Tactician

Rommel has been hailed as a brilliant tactician and competent strategist but certainly not without flaws. Contemporaries who had to work with him under adversity often had very few kind words to say about him and his abilities. Following Paulus' return from his inspection of Rommel's doings in North Africa and also considering the reports submitted by Alfred Gause, Halder concluded: "Rommel's character defects make him very hard to get along with but no one cares to come out in open opposition because of his brutality and the backing he has at top level." Others mentioned his leadership style, which expected much of his commanders, while not being open to criticism or objections. He had little patience for sub-commanders who did not do their jobs properly. Only three weeks after assuming command of the 7th Panzer Division in February 1940, Rommel found a battalion commander performing below par and had the man relieved of command and sent on his way in 90 minutes. This management style would certainly send a signal that he demanded the utmost of his men, but it was bound to create a feeling of resentment among some of his officers.

F. W. von Mellenthin, who served on Rommel's staff during the Africa campaign, wrote that Rommel took great chances on several occasions, gambling entire battles on decisions made almost on the spur of the moment and with incomplete information. He cited Rommel's counterattack during Operation Crusader as just one such instance. Others who served under him in Africa, most notably General Fritz Bayerlein, said he took risks but only after carefully weighing the potential dangers and rewards.Rommel himself was aware of his growing reputation as a gambler and added careful notes in his papers explaining and defending his actions, especially concerning his decision to drive into Egypt during the 1942 Summer Offensive. [31]

While some aggressive subordinates, like Hans von Luck, praised his leadership from the front, Mellenthin questioned this leadership style as it often led to disinvolvement of his staff officers in the fight instead of their maintaining an overview of the situation. His consequential long absences from HQ also meant that subordinates had to make decisions without consulting Rommel, leading to confusion.

In France, Rommel's aggressive drive through the French and British lines, disregarding the safety of his flanks and rear, succeeded to a remarkable degree. His bold attacks often caused larger enemy formations to surrender but his aggressiveness did cause resentment among fellow officers, however, who felt he at times acted too recklessly and failed to keep his sub-commanders and colleague commanders properly informed of his intentions. He was also criticized for claiming too much of the glory himself, neglecting support from other elements of the Wehrmacht and downplaying other units' achievements.

Rommel won many battles in Africa in 1941 and 1942 against British forces that always outnumbered him and generally had better supply lines, through aggressive action. On several occasions he violated direct orders not to attack. But his eagerness to drive for Egypt, when the necessary logistical support was lacking, meant that these drives ultimately failed with great losses. Rommel perceived "unique opportunities" in capturing Egypt and perhaps the Middle East. This result would definitely have had a huge impact on the course of the war, but his grand vision was never supported by Hitler nor the General Staff in Berlin to the extent that Rommel desired.

Rommel himself only belatedly acknowledged that his continual supply problems were not the result of intransigence or slacking by the Italians, who handled the transshipment of his supplies, but were a result of his aggressive actions in overextending his lines of communication. In his analysis of the logistical aspects of the North African Campaign, military historian Martin van Creveld wrote:

Given that the Wehrmacht was only partly motorized and unsupported by a really strong motor industry; that the political situation necessitated the carrying of much useless Italian ballast; that the capacity of the Libyan ports was so small, the distances to be mastered so vast; it seems clear that, for all of Rommel's tactical brilliance, the problem of supplying an Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble. ... Rommel's repeated defiance of his orders and attempts to advance beyond a reasonable distance from his bases, however, was mistaken and should never have been tolerated.

British General Harold Alexander commanded Allied forces in the Middle East facing Rommel in Egypt (from August 1942) and later commanded 18th Army Group in Tunisia. In his official despatch on the campaign in Africa, he wrote of Rommel :

He was a tactician of the greatest ability, with a firm grasp of every detail of the employment of armour in action, and very quick to seize the fleeting opportunity and the critical turning point of a mobile battle. I felt certain doubts, however, about his strategic ability, in particular as to whether he fully understood the importance of a sound administrative plan. Happiest while controlling a mobile force directly under his own eyes he was liable to overexploit immediate success without sufficient thought for the future.

Sir David Hunt, one of Alexander's intelligence officers, expressed the view in his own book that:

...his real gift was for commanding an armoured regiment, perhaps a division, and that his absolute ceiling was an armoured corps.