Such conclusions fail to recognize that it is always necessary to employ the best weapon for the intended objective at the correct time and commit it in terrain that does not grant the enemy an advan­tage before the operation even begins. The troop leader must continuously attend to the prerequi­sites for the operation, not only through choice of terrain and correct timing, but also through proper force ratios and effective combat support, particu­larly from the air.

The main battle tank (Kampfpanzer) is limited by technical requirements and does not have unlim­ited capabilities (protection against all possible threats). It requires a precise balance between a practical level of protection, on the one hand, and, in the final analysis, the far more important capabil­ity to function against the enemy. That combination is the ability to dominate the battlefield. It comes from the sum of the tank's capabilities and not from over-emphasis on a single characteristic. Only when firepower, mobility, protection and command and control capability are combined in a balanced whole can a tank function effectively as a system and be more effective than a system which was not con­ceived according to these principles. Other aspects also contribute to effectiveness, such as good train­ing of the crew, a high level of technical reliability, a large logistical operating range etc.

It is, in the final analysis, futile to argue whether the Tiger or some other tank was the best armored fighting vehicle of the Second World War. The mass-produced M4 Sherman stood no chance in a direct engagement with a Tiger. Nevertheless, it was a suc­cessful model because it was technically reliable and was provided to the troops in inexhaustible num­bers. The Soviet T-34 was rugged and did not require a high-technology industrial base for its mass production.

What advantage did the Tiger provide the Wehrmacht if the enemy manufactured 20 tanks to every Tiger that left the factory? It was "acceptable" for an American crew to "consume" half a dozen or more Shermans between landing in France and arriving at Germany's borders.

A successful main battle tank thus depends on a series of factors. It was quite clear that the chances for survival for a tank crew in a Panzerkampfwagen IV were  significantly lower than  in  a Tiger.  It would not have been advantageous to the Wehrma­cht if, instead of a Tiger, three or four Panzer­kampfwagen IV's had been manufactured.    Even    the best weapons system must finally bow to quantitative threats. Although produced at considerably more cost, the Panther and Tiger con­tributed   to   delaying   the unavoidable end of the war. The comments made in the    following    book    are based on two things. First, the content of the regula­tions will be explained. The regulations,   however,   con­tain only the bare essentials and  include   only  general statements about the prac­tice—about  the   "how"   of armored operations.

By far the greatest por­tion of the text consists of the knowledge gained that was directly derived from actual experience in opera-

tions. That knowledge was collected through hours of discussion with former Panzer soldiers of all ranks, evaluation of combat reports and accounts of personal experiences along with, of course, the per­sonal experience of the author as an armor officer and leader/commander in numerous combat exer­cises ranging from platoon leadership through com­mand of tank and antitank (Panzerjager) companies and, finally, an armor battalion.

In the formation of the post-war German army—the Bundeswehr—the majority of the princi­ples of leadership and employment as practiced in the Wehrmacht were adopted wholesale. That was particularly the case with most of the officers in the 1950's, and even in the 1960's, many of whom had previously served in the Wehrmacht.

  Development of German Armor Tactics

Given the great success of German armor forma­tions in World War II, it is surprising that the forma­tion of armor units and the doctrine for their employment did not proceed in a directly linear and purposeful manner. Just as in other countries, the majority of officers did not recognize the promising possibilities of motorization. In spite of iso­lated significant successes with tanks, they were viewed primarily as support weapons for infantry in France and Great Britain. Only hesitantly were other directions tried (British experimental exer­cises in 1934 on Salisbury Plain and the formation of two armored divisions in France).

In Germany, too, the theoreticians who thought progressively ran up against the massive opposition of traditionalists. Forced to make up with quality for lack of quantity, a more intensive start was already being made with the formation of so-called mobile troops (schnelle Truppen) as early as the formation of the Reichswehr. These mobile troops built on the experience of the cavalry. The first step was the use of motor vehicles for reconnaissance and transport functions rather than weapons carriers. This might seem strange, considering the unhappy German experience with Allied tanks on the Western Front in the First World War. However, many had a false picture of the capabilities of tanks. They were seen as ponderous, mechanically unreliable systems with an extremely limited radius of action that were all too easy to stop when committed against a massed defensive system. Such an evaluation was indeed limited and naive, but it was predominant at the beginning of the Second World War and favored the initial success of the Germans. [32]

Although he was progressive in his thinking about many things, the Chief of the General Staff, General Beck, opposed the formation of a so-called motorized combat troop (Kraftfahrkampftruppe). Most theoreticians traced their thinking back to the experience of the First World War. Based on the decrease in significance of cavalry, it was felt that air­planes and tanks could not in any way carry lead to the reintroduction of mobile operational principles. In turning away from the basic principle of "move­ment," the conduct of operations focused exclu­sively on the factor of "fire" (effect).

It is significant diat as early as 1921 the Chief of the Army High Command (Chef der Heeresleitung), General von Seeckt, stated in a memoran­dum, "Fundamental Considerations for the Rebuilding of Our Armed Forces" (Grundlegende Gedanken fur den Wiederaufbau unserer Wehrmacht): ". . . that less than ever does the salvation of the weaker lie in rigid defenses, but rather in mobile attack." Paradoxically, in a land that had been thoroughly demilitarized by the victors and was scarcely capable of defending itself, the princi­ples of free-reigning operations and the offensive employment of armor was increasingly being recog­nized. With this thought, possibilities increased for a numerically inferior but better equipped and mobile operating force. The dreams of the infantryman, who had been pulverized by artillery in crush­ing positional warfare during the First War, also played a subliminal roll. It was important to seize the opportunity to penetrate the static elements of the operational thinking of the time!

The manifold opposition and hindrances to the formation of such troops were finally overcome in the mid-thirties, when Reichskanzler Hitler person­ally took an obvious interest in thematter. He, him­self, was marked by the trauma of positional warfare and was promulgating expansionist ideas. It was especially obvious to him that the armored branch of the service (Panzerwaffe) had the potential to offer an especially effective instrument with which one could wager the step across the borders.

That also tipped the balance toward the estab­lishment of armor formations with particular char­acteristics. In contrast to the armored battalions of other nations, the new armor battalions (Panzer-abteilungen) were seen from the start as capable of carrying out independent operations, rather than just as support for the infantry. Among other things, the essential step in the right direction came in 1935 from a great demonstration and experimental exercise in North Germany near Munster, that was, at times, attended by Hitler in person. The forma­tion of the new Panzerwaffe matched Hitler's politi­cal interests. Laughably, a number of generals later attributed their opposition to the mechanization of the army to having recognized this at that time! It was important then for the few creators of the Ger­man Panzertruppe to set about forming an effective army with the few resources available and making Germany capable of defending itself.