Rommel, not completely in touch with his headquarters, had halted the infantry attack upon Capuzzo and suddenly realised that 21st Panzer was not where he had believed it to be and could not, therefore, participate in a plan which he had worked out. Gradually he became aware that the reducing strength of the Africa Corps, the increased difficulties at Tobruk, the supply situation, and British air superiority were factors which would prevent his plans reaching fruition. One factor of which he was certainly unaware was that 8th Army had gained its second wind and was preparing to renew the battle not to break it off. The British in the area south of Sidi Rezegh had regrouped along the Trigh el Abd and had re-equipped their units with fresh supplies of tanks. A newly driven corridor through to Tobruk, although narrow was firm, and British pressure had forced the Axis units back; but in hand-to-hand fighting 90th Light Division on the northern wall of the corridor and Bottcher Group along the southern prevented the gap from being widened. [12]
![Rommel's Deutsches Afrika Korps 1941-1943 _16.jpg](https://litlife.club/books/260904/read/images/_16.jpg)
The British received the news that 21st Panzer Division was swinging westward again; 30 Corps used 2nd New Zealand Division to guard its back against the panzer units now roaring towards it and took up a defensive posture in the Gambut-Gabr Saleh sector. The fighting which had flared up around Tobruk increased in intensity and threatened the German units with complete disintegration as British pressure began to roll up their flanks.
At dusk on 27 November the 21st Panzer Division moved from Bardia to Gambut and 15th Panzer Division, acting on its orders drove along the Trigh Capuzzo on the left flank of 21st Panzer, overrunning in its advance, 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters, and capturing 500 men and 6 guns. The mass of 15th Panzer then reached the Trigh Capuzzo and headed for Tobruk against moderate opposition. But as the unit drew near the town opposition stiffened and the British tried everything to hold the Africa Corps' return from the Sollum front. The 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades went in — part of 7th Armoured Division which had now been reinforced to a point where it was now nearly as strong as the panzer units of the whole Africa Corps - but in the event 15th Panzer proved strong enough to cope with the situation. By evening the panzer force had driven to the area west of Gabr el Arid and had laagered south of Sciasciuf, there to await the arrival of 21st Panzer. The Ariete Division lay south of the Trigh Capuzzo and the whole armoured might of the Axis army, extended across the desert south-west of Gambut. was facing the British.
To the west of Sidi Rezegh there was-the Bottcher Group and the Italian Divisions, to the north the 90th Light Division, while from the east there was the growing pressure of the two panzer and one Italian armoured divisions. But not until he contacted his headquarters did Rommel know that far from being beaten as he thought the British might still gain the upper hand through their better supply position for they were still able to renew their strength with fresh men and tanks while theAxis forces had reached the end of their tether.
During the period from 24 to 27 November the fortunes of the Panzer Group Africa can be seen to have changed alarmingly and by 27th the situation around Tobruk had become critical. The ring round the town had been split, the Axis forces driven back and at the end of their strength. The 30 Corps had been massively reinforced and was again posing a serious problem south-east of the town. The supply system, already bad, had become critical and there were grave doubts expressed whether Corps had the strength to restore the situation.
The rainy morning of 28 November saw 21st Panzer Division encountering heavy resistance around Zaafran but not only had part of it held the eastern pressure out of Tobruk but other elements made contact with 90th Light and. on the southern flank another column of the division passed Bir el Chleta and headed for Sidi Rezegh to which sector 15th Panzer Division was also heading. That formation put its main on the important high ground south of Belhamed and drove off the counter-attacks to the south which 8th Army had launched. During the day and despite the poor light a collaboration between 15th Panzer and Ariete Divisions encircled a number of British tank groups. The German commanders now were obtaining a clearer picture of the situation and their speedy regrouping allowed them to begin operations aimed at defeating the New Zealand and British forces.
One thing was very clear to the German command; although British material losses could be speedily replaced the restoration of confidence in the tanks and in the leadership would take much longer to build up. This point was borne out in Kippenberger's book Infantry Brigadier where he claimed that throughout the 8th Army there was a most intense distrust, almost a hatred of our, that is to say the British, armour. Suspecting this feeling Rommel reasoned that 8th Army must be beaten before it had fully recovered for he knew that already British forces were regrouping and reforming without let or hindrance along the Trigh el Abd, an area now empty of Axis troops.
The question which Rommel had to decide that day was whether to drive die British and Imperial forces, positioned around Sidi Rezegh, back into Tobruk or to cut them off from the town and to destroy them in the field. He decided on the latter course. The 21st Panzer Division held position and was involved in fierce fighting on both sides of the Trigh Capuzzo while 15th Panzer drove past the New Zealand flank to thrust back South African counter-attacks eventually to link up with the Bottcher Group and XXI Italian Corps. A short rest and then 15th Panzer swung northwards gaining in strength as it picked up other Axis fighting units from the area through which it passed before it went on to attack and to capture El Duda from the Tobruk garrison. So fast had been the pace of the advance that the infantry had become separated from the panzer spearhead and armoured personnel carriers had to halt their advance to go back and to porter the troops. The !osses suffered that day were more than usually heavy and regimental strength of one infantry regiment had been reduced to 150 men by the time that El Duda had been taken. At that place, determined in spirit but weak in number the Germans took up all round defence but strong British infantry assaults drove back the German infantry from their positions and in the fighting more than half of them were taken prisoners of war.
Ariete and 15th Panzer Division then came under a series of heavy but unco-ordinated attacks launched by 7th Armoured Division and 1st South African Division on the southern flank trying to break through to the New Zealand Division but on 21st Panzer Division's sector the aggressive defence put up by the New Zealanders forced the Germans to commit its last few reserves. During the afternoon an attack by 4th Armoured Brigade hit the Bottcher Group but was deflected while the 15th Panzer Division swung through the intervals in the Axis line and struck north towards El Duda. The Africa Corps battle report recorded the destruction of 20 British tanks from a group of 100 which had begun an attack and these severe losses forced 8th Army's leaders to order a withdrawal south.
On the far northern flank of the battle 90th Light made strenuous efforts to close the narrow corridor but despite its struggle and the intervention of an anti-tank company no firm link had been made with 15th Panzer by that evening. Panzer Group had now concentrated and surrounded the main of the New Zealand and elements of 7th Armoured Division. The corridor was narrowing in width, British attacks on the southern front were weakening and were being beaten off, only on the far eastern Sollum front had there been defeats. The garrisons at Bardia, Sollum, and Halfaya were once again surrounded and cut off. The decisive attack against the New Zealand Division went in on 30 November but it was not co-ordinated because 15th Panzer Division arrived late at its start line, for as a result of false orders it had beer, given its units had had to spend the night in a fruitless desert march. To hide the direction of the main Axis thrust feint assaults were made against a number of points, particularly at Sidi Rezegh. Although the German assaults began well the Royal Air Force attacks soon halted the forward movement for the British High-Command, realising the desperate situation, had brought every arm to bear to aid the encircled troops who were defending themselves with the utmost tenacity. Particularly did the strength of the British artillery distinguish itself during the fighting and the panzer forces gained a healthy respect for its accuracy and its punch.