The plan to surround and to crush 7th Armoured Division in the area south of Sidi Rezegh had succeeded by the evening of 23rd and the victory was the fruit of a number of fortunate decisions and measures. The thrust by 15th Panzer into the area of Gasr el Arid gave the opportunity of a flank thrust and the decision to continue with that drive destroyed the British numerical superiority and thus by 23rd it was possible for the Germans to meet their opponents on a relatively equal footing. Although the fighting on 22nd had destroyed parts of the British armoured division, by the following day not only 7th Armoured but also elements of the South African Division had been defeated with a loss of 3000 prisoners, 120 guns, and 80 tanks. One brigade of 7th Armoured and one of the South African division had been totally destroyed, together with nearly all the guns of the armoured brigade, many tonics, and so many tanks that by evening it had only 40 machines ready to continue the fighting on 24th.

While on the western front 30 Corps was bleeding and wounded 13 Corps had been making slow but steady progress and the pressure which its troops were exerting was beginning to make itself felt on the battlefield. The advance by 6th New Zealand Brigade against one German regiment brought its leading elements close to the eastern side of Sidi Rezegh airfield, other elements had captured Gambut while the main of the division had captured Bardia, had struck along the Trigh Capuzzo, and other 13 Corps units had captured parts of Sollum against strong resistance. On the Tobruk front break-out attempts had captured several strong points from the Italians and the Indian Brigade had at last reached Gialo against severe Italian resistance. The first part of the British offensive was closed on 23 November with a victory for the Axis. The British plan to crush Rommel had failed. [11]

Lacking a clear picture of events and influenced by the results of the fighting of 23 November, Rommel formed the impression that 8th Army was defeated and this confidence permeated to regimental level. As an example the verbal orders given to 5th Panzer Regiment by commander of 15th Panzer Division said that the beaten enemy was withdrawing to the south-east and that the divisional task was to pursue the British via Gabr Saleh and Gasr el Arid, to break through to the frontier and to reach the area south of Sollum. Shortly thereafter the order to move off at top speed was given and even though the battle group had not been formed, the advance began.

Despite his losses and the exhaustion of his troops the German commander-in-chief thought he could scent victory and determined to go all out to achieve this. But the Panzer weapon which he was now wielding had lost much of its edge, for on the morning of 24 November the total number of armoured fighting vehicles still ready for action with Africa Corps was only 80. The British armour, shrunken but still a potent force, regrouped along the Trigh el Abd and then formed square around the forward supply depots upon which its whole existence depended.

Another day of crises and battle followed on 24 November and the statement in this book that war in the desert was decided by the side which could rein­force continually with men and machines is seen to be proved for the British were falling back upon stocks of supplies and reinforcements, although the new men to fight the tanks were often without battle experience. Against this continual and short haul replenishment the Germans had a long and arduous drive from rear depots hundreds of miles removed and only their superior tank recovery and repair service was able to keep up the strength of the army in the field.

Cruwell, Africa Corps commander, reported on the course of the battle and his appreciation of the situation reinforced Rommel's own mistaken belief that 7th Armoured Division had been destroyed as a potent fighting unit. Rommel then decided upon a long range penetration from Sidi Rezegh to Sidi Omar and to Halfaya. His intentions were to raise the siege at the latter place, to build up his eastern flank for an advance into Egypt, and to spread a net to intercept and catch the British forces as they retreated from Sidi Rezegh. To carry out this 'dash to the wire' he would have to move the greatest part of his force and leave only minimal strength positioned around Tobruk. Battle Group Bottcher, a force made up of two battalions from 155th Regiment, one battalion of 361 (Africa) Regiment, engineers and artillery had the task of holding Belhamed and thus protecting the southern flank. The remainder of 90th Light Division was to hold the Via Balbia against all attacks from the east and to halt the break out attempts from the town.

The trans-desert group was despatched with great haste and with orders that there would be no halt for battle en route to the intercepting points; speed was of the essence. At 10:00 hrs having had little time for rest or maintenance, 21st Panzer Division led by Rommel and with the reconnaissance battalion in the van, advanced as a single box towards Sidi Omar. Then followed 15th Panzer, to take up position on the right flank of the thrust and then, at 13:00hrs, the Ariete Division moved out. There was to be no thought of flank protection during the advance - no care nor concern for what was happening on the left or right wings — the thrust was everything and nothing must be allowed to impede it. Weak British units were overrun and stronger forces were avoided. As the panzer boxes advanced 8th Army artillery and tank assaults accompanied them, but against these latter self-propelled guns were used and the lines of 8.8cm flak upon which the British tank commanders were again seduced into making piecemeal attacks.

The sudden presence of panzer units so far in the British rear produced panic and rumour among the non-combatant echelons and as these headed south to escape the panzer clasp the stories they spread created uproar in the area through which the panzers were thundering. By the afternoon German armour stood at the Egyptian /rentier. In the advance the panzer force had had to skirt Sidi Omar, for that place had been captured by 7th Brigade of 4th Indian Division, across whose 'tail' the panzers had driven.

At the frontier wire 5th Panzer Regiment halted and at 16:00hrs began to consolidate and to concentrate its units south of Trigh el Abd. The main of 21st Panzer Division pressed on eastwards into Egypt without the panzer regiment for it had run out of fuel and ammunition. The German wireless sets, already defective before the offensive had begun, had virtually ceased to function. Communications between the two panzer divisions had been lost and from Corps headquarters there was silence. Out of contact with its sister units and its main headquarters the armour of Africa Corps was moving blindly into the unknown. In an effort to establish the true picture, patrols were sent out by both panzer divisions to regain contact, a difficult task this as the last armoured car belonging to 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion had been destroyed that day by a Royal Air Force air attack. At 22:00hrs 15th Panzer patrols not only brushed with British armour 20 miles south of Sidi Omar but also found 5th Panzer Regiment. Then came the intelligence that Ariete had not advanced past Gabr Saleh.

Fortune favoured the British during the night when 8th Army's carefully camouflaged but otherwise unguarded main store depots lay within a few miles of 21st Panzer Division as it lay halted on the battlefield waiting for its supply trucks. The presence of strong German forces within a few minutes drive of the stores which, if captured, would enable Rommel to forge strongly ahead caused the British command many anxious hours for there were no troops which could have been sent out in time to protect the depots from assault and capture. But Rommel had his eyes fixed firmly on Maddalena and Mersa Matruh and it was upon these places that he was directing his forces. He was aware that his position was not a strong one. Although he stood deep in the British flank, was in touch with the garrison at Halfaya, and was athwart the British lines of communication, it was equally true that his troops were widely scattered, had no communication with each other, and thai British troops were across his lines of supply. To protect the soft-skinned vehicle convoys, prey to the roving bands of British armoured car patrols during the dangerous journey across the desert, Rommel ordered that they be escorted by any available fighting vehicles and this temporary expedient eventually became a standard battle procedure. Rommel's thrust eastwards was the turning point of the battle. German defensive tactics had proved themselves and the ring around Tobruk still held; 30 Corps had been badly mauled and the remnants of 7th Armoured Division were not at that time in a position to resume offensive operation. The New Zealand Division was isolated and should have been withdrawn back to its start lines.