The advance continued on 24 January when 15th Panzer with the 21st Panzer Division on its left flank swung south from Antelat opening a broad front as the advance was made towards Maaten Giofer. The Battle Group Marcks and an Italian unit continued to drive eastward to close a ring around the British and by midday of 24th these had been cleared from the area south-east of Agedabia and had lost 117 of their tanks in the severe fighting. Some British units escaped through a corridor between the Marcks Group and 21st Panzer Division but the main was surrounded and destroyed. On the morning of 25 January the panzer group moved forward again and attacked Msus, the main British supply depot, from which the Axis troops obtained no less than 600 trucks, 127 guns, and 280 armoured fighting vehicles.

The next move was to regroup and to form four battle groups which were to move upon Mechili and on 25th, while the bulk of the Africa Corps rested in the Msus-Antelat area, reconnaissance detachments and motorised infantry carried the advance eastwards. The Marcks Group, which Rommel led in person and in pouring rain throughout the long cold night, brought the assault forward until in the grey dawn of 27 January he had reached El Regima. By the afternoon that place had fallen and with it the airport of Benghasi. An infantry battle group cut round behind the town to block the Via Balbia and to deal within the city the British troops still fighting there. Once again the booty captured served the Axis forces well for more than 1300 trucks were captured together with food, equipment, and petrol.

There was no time for rest and once Ariete had taken over security duties east of Benghasi and Trieste Division had begun to carry out the same tasks in the Gemines sector the German reconnaissance in force continued at a mad pace. The coastal towns along the Via Balbia were taken one after the other defeating or throwing back the mainly Indian garrisons until at last Derna was reached.

Then began the final stages of the German advance to the Gazala positions ind at first these were to be occupied by the reconnaissance detachments only while the bulk of the Africa Corps stayed in Benghasi. The Italian XXI Corps was ordered to move up to secure the area between Benghasi and Agedabia. The first new mine-fields were begun on 3 February, the start of belts of such defences which reached deep into the desert from the coast for a distance of over 150 miles.

In the relative peace which the efforts of the strenuous campaigning of the past months then forced upon both sides, the Germans and their Italian comrades strengthened and improved their positions. The Gialo Oasis was occupied and thereby the southern flank of the Axis line was secured. Behind the main Gazala mine-fields others less extensive in area but dominating important sectors were also laid and anti-tank gun positions sited. The nex: months were taken up with resting, training, and preparing the troops for the forthcoming offensives of the summer.

  Strike at Gazala

Cyrenaica was now safe but the undefeated 8th Army lay just across the desert and the conviction that British resources were seemingly inexhaustible, revived Rommel's fear that thousands of British tanks would one day come storming out of the desert. He decided to strike a pre-emptive blow which would capture Tobruk and then go forward to the Nile delta. But the genesi; of the German summer offensive had been an OKW order issued on 30 June 1941, which laid out a grand strategy in which a southern pincer would drive through Egypt to link up with two northern arms, one of which woulc advance from Bulgaria through Turkey and the other from the Caucasus through Iran. The success of this giant pincer movement was predicated upon the capture of Tobruk for Hitler refused to seize the Tunisian ports through which the army could have been more easily reinforced and supplied.

Cavallero, of Commando Supremo, planned to establish a giant depot at Agedabia from which the Axis troops could be nourished during their advance, but as an undefeated Malta remained a base from which Axis convoys could be attacked then Malta would have to be taken out. Dis­cussions at the highest level authorised Rommel to mount an attack upon Tobruk but added that he was to halt at the Egyptian frontier to allow the maximum support to be given to the Malta undertaking. The timetable for the operation was the end of May to mid-June and Rommel was directed that if Tobruk did not fall then a withdrawal back to Gazala must be made.

The strain of battle had reduced the unit strengths but not the confidence of the Africa Corps but then convoys arrived bringing across reinforcements and equipment to fill out the shrunken units and to rearm them.

In addition to individual tanks whole companies of fresh men and machines came in and 5th Panzer Regiment of 21st Panzer Division which in February had had less than 70 panzers, had, by the end of April, been reinforced to a strength of 165, an establishment which the regiment had never had before nor would ever reach again. There was still a shortage of soft-skinned vehicles so that some units had only 60 of their official strength of 400 trucks. There were 12,000 men fewer than establishment for the whole of the Africa Corps, whose total strength, including supply troops for rear elements, was only 36,000 all ranks, the most acute shortage being in infantry.

Rommel then began to prepare the men of his command for the battle ahead. During May individual training gave place to company schemes and to collaboration with armour both by day and night. Special emphasis was laid on attacking prepared positions and permanent fortifications. Storm troop units were formed and these worked with combat engineers and tanks so that all-arm co-operation would be at a high peak of efficiency when the attack went in. By the end of May there were large-scale, divisional manoeuvres.

The 21st Panzer Division had been carrying out extensive patrol activity against severe British opposition and then the whole Africa Corps advanced into 'no man's land' at the south-eastern corner of Cyrenaica. This move ful­filled the purposes of thickening the battle line, of providing the maximum strength should 8th Army attack, and, lastly, of forming a firm jumping-off point for the panzers in the forthcoming battle. Officers were taken on secret reconnaissances to familiarise them with the terrain over which they would be fighting, forward fuel depots were, built up, and slowly, so as not to arouse suspicion, the number of shells fired was reduced to allow stocks to be gathered. On 12 May Rommel briefed the divisional commanders and then began the last minute preparations; traffic control points were established and the second echelon details sent back. To equip the fighting troops, orders were issued that all weapons, including those in training establishments and de­tachments, were to be handed in. The Africa Corps had girded itself for battle.

The 8th Army's defensive positions at Gazala stretched from the sea to Bir Hachim, a distance of some 45 miles and along the length of this very strong line defensive positions, known as boxes, had been laid out. These were usually sited on high or broken ground and capable of all round defence. They were intended mutually to be supporting and each of them had a strong garrison usually of brigade or equivalent establishment. To the west, that is the enemy side, lay extensive mine-fields of considerable depth and, in some areas, this sea of mines had been laid down on the eastern or 'friendly' side of the boxes.

To hold the forward, static defences Ritchie, 8th Army commander, put in 13 Corps. In the north, at Gazala, was 1st South African Division, then to the south 50th Infantry Division and 3000 men of 1st Free French Brigade holding the left flank box at Bir Hachim. This left wing was extended and strengthened by putting into a hastily prepared box, south-east of Bir Hachim. the newly arrived 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. At certain strategically important points along the southern flank and extending eastwards there were other boxes of which Knightsbridge, held by 22nd Guards Brigade, and El Adem were the most important. Behind the infantry boxes to give immediate support were 1st and 32nd Army Tank Brigades and behind this, located west and south of Tobruk, was the armoured mass of 8th Army, formed into 30 Corps. The 1st Armoured Division lay aside the Trigh Capuzzo and con­trolled the central sector while 7th Armoured Division was positioned farther south to deal with any threat from the direction of Bir Hachim.