Then 15th Panzer Division moved forward to the Trigh Capuzzo where it gained touch with Ariete and had thereby cut off large numbers of 8th Army troops. Many of these made desperate efforts to escape under cover of the sandstorm and one group of 40 tanks and 200 lorries made repeated attempts to smash the encircling ring and escape to the east. Artillery fire drove back the British convoy. Although there had been a slight improvement in the supply situation it was still critical and seemed likely to remain so. Accord­ingly, Africa Corps commander proposed that the troops east of the British mine-fields should move westward through the newly created gaps and thus regain their start line area. Rommel proposed another alternative; he would reverse his front, giving ground as he moved slowly back towards the gaps through which the convoys of lorries would come. Once refuelled and rearmed he would then regroup and renew the attack.

At 02.00hrs the Africa Corps began its westward withdrawal protected by rear guards against a possible British move. Despite some losses in the mine­fields, Corps reached Bir Sidi Muftah at 06.00hrs where they surprised and were surprised by British troops. Corps had run head on into a 'box', held in strength by 150th Brigade from 50th Division, positioned between, and thus dominating, the two mine-field gaps. The first attack by the panzer division was halted at the edge of the mine-field and then driven back by anti-tank guns. The order was issued that the box must be taken quickly for by 11.30hrs the situation had deteriorated alarmingly and fresh crises were at hand. The 90th Light was being pressed by 1st Tank Brigade at Bir Harmat. there was heavy fighting along the Trigh Capuzzo where 22nd Armoured Brigade was trying to outflank Corps; 21st Panzer was wincing under a bombardment of unusual ferocity coming out of Gazala and the Royal Air Force was attacking every enemy column.

Victory now seemed certain for 8th Army; Rommel's forces, constricted within a small area bounded by the Trigh Bir Hachim, Trigh Capuzzo, and Trigh el Abd, were being pressed on to the British mine-fields. The two gaps which the Axis engineers had managed to create were so narrow that move­ment was slow; they were dominated by British artillery and movement only by night was possible. The whole determination of Africa Corps was centred upon holding off the British in the east while consolidating in the west, but this was impossible so long as the 150th Brigade box remained.

But if Rommel had his hours of anxiety the British, too, had had their moments of concern. The attacks by 2nd and 22nd Armoured Brigades had been crushed by the anti-tank gun screen and Guards Brigade had been hit while making a sortie from the Knightsbridge box and had been driven back with heavy loss.

Rommel's luck did not, however, desert him for during the night of 30/31 st supply trucks reached Corps concentration area and, when in the morning both panzer divisions reported themselves ready for action, army head­quarters ordered them to expand their fronts and to take out the box at Got el Ualeb - the 150th Brigade position. The first unprepared and hastily organised assaults were driven back by the determined defenders supported by the remnants of a tank regiment.

The 8th Army, unaware that Rommel's supply position had been eased still optimistically believed that the Panzer Army was withdrawing from battle through the mine-field gaps and considered that the German loss of 371 tanks represented a more damaging blow to the Africa Corps than its own loss of 384 vehicles meant to it.

German attacks against the 150th Brigade box at Got el Ualeb came in during the day and one which captured Point 174 enabled the panzer division's artillery observation post (OP) to direct the fire of his guns with devastating effect The concentration of the whole effort of Africa Corps to take out the box dominated 1 June. At 07.30hrs, 30 panzer from 15th Division and a battalion of 104th Regiment, together with the Corps battle group struck down from the north, while from the south came 90th Light and then from the south-east elements from Trieste Division. Within the perimeter of the box the last five tanks of 44th Royal Tank Regiment formed line and went out to fight an unequal duel. In the great silence which, for a few minutes, hung over the stricken field the only noise was the creaking of the tracks as the armoured fighting vehicles moved towards the anti-tank gun line. Only one returned. Still resistance was being offered and Rommel led an abortive attack by 5th Panzer Regiment thrusting westwards through the northern lane intending to swing this assault through the mine-field and to attack 150th Brigade from the west. Uncleared mines destroyed 12 of his tanks and the assault was called off. Under cover of almost continuous Stuka dive-bomber assaults the German infantry supported by tanks beat their way through the British opposition until they had linked with the spearhead of the Italian division. Other German units on the eastern flank held off the weak and unco-ordinated attacks aimed at relieving the trapped brigade but by midday it was all over.

With the central box destroyed the German supply route was secure but the real significance was that the Axis armies held a firm bridgehead out of which they could advance. Rommel now directed his attention away from the dying battle and decided to clear the southern wing before reverting to his original plan of striking northwards. Thus, for 2 June, he ordered that 90th Light Division together with Trieste Division were to capture the Bir Hachim box under cover of a mock attack launched by the remainder of Africa Corps.

During the days from 2 to 10 June a battle of attrition was fought in the Knightsbridge and Bir Hachim areas. The 21st Panzer Division was at first ordered northwards while 15th Panzer was held to await developments in the southern sector. This order to split the armoured force was queried by the staff officers at army headquarters for the secret of the great success won by Africa Corps was that it had always struck as a single, invincible block. The officers realised that to follow the commander's order would spread the power of the Corps thinly across an area from Bir Hachim to the Via Balbia and this against a British Army which still retained freedom of manoeuvre together with a great number of tanks which it could commit to battle. As if to confirm the fears of the army staff, 8th Army launched a series of attacks under cover of the khamsin. The first drove in against 15th Panzer, then against Ariete, and finally against 21st Panzer. Rommel cancelled the original order and led 90th Light and Trieste Divisions southwards intending to capture the box at Bir Hachim.

There was little alteration in the battle scene on 3 June for both sides were regrouping, rearming, and preparing for the next round. Ritchie, 8th Army commander, was determined to gain the initiative and wireless intercepts were able to supply the intelligence to Panzer Army headquarters that 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades, a total of about 400 tanks, were forming south of Bir Harmat Other British armoured and infantry forces had formed along the southern front of Ariete Division. Rommel ordered that Bir Hachim was to be taken, that the two Axis mobile Corps were to remain on the defensive, and the Crüwell Group was to continue its attacks on the northern and western flank. The 15th Panzer was instructed to drive by night, together with 114th Rifle Regiment, along the Trigh el Abd north of Sidi Belafarid and then in a general south-easterly direction to pass through the mine-field, to gain and to enlarge a bridgehead from which an encircling attack would be made at some later date.

During the early morning of 5 June British artillery opened a barrage upon the forward elements of Ariete Division and forced that division to give ground. The barrage then switched to 21st Panzer's sector and behind the shells came the armour striking towards the gaps in the mine-fields. The 8th Army was making a pincer movement to destroy the German bridgehead-Aware that, if the British controlled the exits to the mine-field gaps, the Panzer Army would again face supply difficulties the German counter-attacks were frequent and furious. Within the small desert area between the Trigh Bir Hachim, Capuzzo, and El Abd there was then fought the hard and bitter tank battles which have passed into British military history as the Battles of the Cauldron.