Ambroise, p. 96; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, pp. 253, 258–9; Baha al-Din, p. 171.

Ambroise, p. 97; Baha al-Din, pp. 171–2.

Baha al-Din, pp. 172–3; Ambroise, p. 98; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, p. 336.

Ambroise, pp. 99–107; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, pp. 260–80; Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 130–33; Baha al-Din, pp. 174–6; Imad al-Din, p. 344.

Ambroise, pp. 100–101, 103.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 264; Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 131; Baha al-Din, p. 175.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, pp. 268–9; Ambroise, p. 104.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 270; Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 129–31. Richard authored another letter on that same day (this time addressed generally to the people of his realm) which had even less to say about the battle, commenting simply that ‘as we were nearing Arsuf Saladin came swooping down upon us’.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, pp. 274–7; Ambroise, pp. 107–9. Richard I described James of Avesnes as the ‘best of men whose merits had made him dear to the whole army’ and as the ‘pillar’ of the crusade (Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 129–31). Ambroise recalled the circumstances of James’ death, noting that ‘there were some who did not come to his rescue, which gave rise to much talk; this was one of the barons of France, they said, the count of Dreux, he and his men. I have heard so many speak ill of this that the history cannot deny it.’ Unfortunately, no further explanation was offered of Robert of Dreux’s failure to help James.

Flori, Richard the Lionheart, pp. 137–8. Many historians have expressed similar views, suggesting that Richard actively sought battle at Arsuf. These include: Gillingham (Richard I, pp. 173–8) who acknowledged that his account of Arsuf was based on Ambroise’s testimony and described the battle as the ‘height of Richard’s fame’, characterising the king’s handling of the encounter as ‘masterful’ Verbruggen (The Art of Warfare, p. 232) who described Arsuf as ‘the last great triumph of the Christians in the Near East’ and S. Runciman (‘The kingdom of Acre and the later crusades’, A History of the Crusades, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1954), p. 57) who applauded the Lionheart’s ‘superb generalship’. Tyerman (God’s War, pp. 458–9) downplayed the importance of the battle, but nonetheless maintained that Richard wanted to engage Saladin in combat and launch a heavy cavalry charge. Others, like J. P. Phillips (The Crusades 1095–1197 (London, 2002), pp. 146, 151), praised Richard’s ‘brilliant generalship at Arsuf’, while ignoring the question of whether or not the king deliberately sought battle. Smail (Crusading Warfare, p. 163) did describe Arsuf as a natural event that was merely part of the process of a fighting march, but still believed that Richard had planned the crusader charge (pp. 128–9).

Baha al-Din, pp. 175–7; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 338–9.

Baha al-Din, p. 178; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 338–42.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 284; Ambroise, p. 114. There can be little doubt that Richard was contemplating an Egyptian campaign from that autumn onwards, as letters to the Genoese dating from October 1191 refer to plans to ‘hasten with all our forces into Egypt’ the following summer ‘for the advantage’ of the Holy Land. Codice Diplomatico della repubblica di Genova, vol. 3, pp. 19–21. Richard showed a deft diplomatic touch in managing to curry the support of the Genoese, while still maintaining the backing of his established allies, the Pisans. Favreau-Lilie, Die Italiener im Heiligen Land, pp. 288–93.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 293; Ambroise, pp. 118–19; Gillingham, ‘Richard I and the Science of War’, pp. 89–90; D. Pringle, ‘Templar castles between Jaffa and Jerusalem’, The Military Orders, vol. 2, ed. H. Nicholson (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 89–109.

Baha al-Din, p. 179.

Baha al-Din, pp. 185–8; Imad al-Din, pp. 349–51. Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 183–5; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 342–3. The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre (La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, p. 151) mentioned the proposed union between al-Adil and Joanne, but this text (also known as the Lyon Eracles) originated in the mid-thirteenth century. The reason for Joanne’s refusal is unclear. Baha al-Din recorded that she flew into a rage when Richard finally presented his plan to her. Imad al-Din, however, believed that she had been willing to enter into such a union, but had been compelled to refuse by the Latin clergy.

Baha al-Din, pp. 193–5; Imad al-Din, pp. 353–4; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 392; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 296; Ambroise, p. 120. Imad al-Din saw Richard’s approaches as duplicitous. Baha al-Din, meanwhile, argued that Saladin’s real ‘aim was to undermine the peace talks’. He recorded a personal conversation in which the sultan emphasised that peace would not end the danger to Islam. Predicting the collapse of Muslim unity after his death and a resurgence in Frankish power, Saladin apparently stated: ‘Our best course is to keep on with the jihad until we expel them from the coast or die ourselves.’ Baha al-Din concluded that ‘this was his own view and it was only against his will that he was persuaded to make peace’. However, this was probably propaganda designed to maintain Saladin’s image as an undefeated mujahid.

Baha al-Din, pp. 194–6.

Ambroise, pp. 123–4; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 304.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 305; Ambroise, p. 126; Mayer, The Crusades, p. 148; Gillingham, Richard I, p. 191; Phillips, The Crusades, p. 151.

Ambroise, p. 126; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 394.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 323; D. Pringle, ‘King Richard I and the walls of Ascalon’, Palestine Exploration Quarterly, vol. 116 (1984), pp. 133–47.

Baha al-Din, p. 200.

La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, p. 141. Richard certainly struggled to clear himself of blame and suspicion, his guilt being widely reported in the courts of Europe. Eventually his supporters devised a solution that exonerated the Lionheart–producing a letter in 1195, purportedly from the Old Man Sinan himself (but almost certainly a forgery), affirming that the Assassins had acted because of a historic grudge against the marquis. Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 199–201.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 359; Ambroise, p. 153.

Baha al-Din, pp. 199–202; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 346–8.

Ambroise, p. 153.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 390; Baha al-Din, pp. 208–9.

Baha al-Din, pp. 209–12.

Ambroise, pp. 163–5; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, pp. 379–82.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum, p. 393; Ambroise, p. 172. Many Latin Christian contemporaries were dismayed by this second retreat. Eyewitnesses, like Ambroise, clearly acknowledged that it was King Richard who foiled the attempt to besiege Jerusalem. Back in the West, however, other chroniclers presented a different version of events, exculpating the Lionheart of blame. Roger of Howden (Chronica, vol. 3, p. 183) actually recorded that Richard had been determined to capture the Holy City, but was stymied by the French, who were reluctant to participate because the king of France had ordered them to return to Europe. Ralph of Coggeshall (pp. 38–40), meanwhile, affirmed that Richard had been about to lead the army on to Jerusalem when Hugh of Burgundy, the Templars and the French refused to fight, fearing that Philip Augustus would be angry with them if they helped the Angevin king capture the Holy City. Ralph added that it was discovered later that Hugh had shamefully entered into a secret alliance with Saladin. Ironically, the notion that the French had foiled the Lionheart’s attempts to conquer Jerusalem stuck and, by the mid-thirteenth century, had become embedded in popular memory. Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 208–10; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 353–4. M. Markowski (‘Richard the Lionheart: Bad king, bad crusader’, Journal of Medieval History, vol. 23 (1997), pp. 351–65) criticised Richard’s conduct during the Third Crusade, branding him ‘a failure as a crusade leader’, but on rather different grounds–namely that ‘any good crusade leader should have done what the army expected’ by launching an assault on Jerusalem whether it was militarily viable or not.