A small comedy of errors was then played out in Tobruk. The British officer, who went to offer the surrender of Tobruk, was directed in error to the headquarters of the Italian Corps commander who then passed him on to the German commander. But this error was enough for Mussolini to proclaim to the Italian people that the offer had been made to the Italians, by implication that the Army had borne the greatest burden in the capture of Tobruk. To trump this Hitler promoted Rommel to the rank of field marshal whereupon Mussolini trumped his partner's ace and first Cavallero and later Bastico both received their marshal's staff. The battle for the Gazala position had ended with the capture of Tobruk and the balance sheet showed that no less than 45,000 British soldiers had been taken prisoner, five of them generals. Nearly 1000 British tanks had been either destroyed or captured, and more than 400 guns had been taken. But this was not the end as Rommel pointed out in an 'Army Order of the Day' 'Now we have the chance to destroy the enemy absolutely. In the coming days I shall make fresh demands upon you in order that we reach our objective.'

  Battle of Alam Halfa - First Alamein

The battle for Marmarica was over and on 22 June Rommel, Bastico, and Kesselring discussed the idea of a continued advance. Bastico demanded a halt in accordance with orders but Rommel, pointing to the materials which had been taken in Tobruk, said that the 8th Army was on the run and that with these supplies the pursuit could be continued. The agreement of the Axis leaders was obtained; the attack could proceed. One group thrust forward to capture Sollum and the Halfaya areas while 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions swept eastwards towards Egypt, with the Italian Motorised Corps left far behind in the tempo of their advance. The pace was exhilarating for all ranks knew that speed was of the essence and despite the weeks that they had spent in battle without rest or respite, it was with high hopes that the battle-hardened warriors of Africa Corps drove towards the wire. They crossed it at 20.30hrs but the advance was not halted and the pursuit was maintained throughout the hours of darkness.

Shortly after first light on 24 June the report was received that the British were withdrawing and the speed was increased to cut them off. The pace of the pursuit had been so furious and the columns so widespread that the supply trucks were again having difficulty in locating the columns. Water began to run short for the ration had been cut so that the vehicles could carry more petrol to bring the advance forward. Even so 21st Panzer Division's tank regiment ran out of fuel and to prevent loss of contact with the 8th Army rearguard, petrol was siphoned from other vehicles to keep the point unit mobile. The speed of the advance, the long periods without servicing, the high temperatures, and the appalling going had so affected the panzers that the drop-out rate was high and the strength of the Africa Corps dropped to 60 runners. The Italians were in little better shape: Ariete had been reduced to 10 tanks, 15 guns, and 600 Bersaglieri. The Trieste had 4 tanks, 24 guns, and 1500 Infantry.

The 8th Army was withdrawing with all speed to its prepared positions at Alamein and relied heavily upon the Royal Air Force to impede by bombing the Panzer drive. On 26th the fierce and unrelenting air attacks prevented the panzers from refuelling and neither division was able to resume the advance until 09.00hrs; four hours of daylight and campaigning time had been lost. During the following day the British rearguard near Mersa Matruh, attempt­ing to hold back the panzer drive, was broken and in the ensuing scrimmage 90th Light cut the Via Balbia. Auchinleck took over command of 8th Army and Mussolini wired from Rome orders which included the naming of Suez as the first objective of Panzer Army. In a bid to hold the Germans west of Matruh the 1st Armoured flung in a series of attacks but these were beaten back and the British forces lost another 18 of their armoured fighting vehicles. Fighting continued all through the night of 27/28th as groups of British units, by-passed during the advance of the day, tried to fight their way out of encirclement. During the afternoon of 28th, the 21st Panzer Division had captured the high ground south-west of Fuka and then went on to seize the aerodrome and to cut the road. The advance was putting a strain on the Axis armour and the evening vehicle state showed that the Africa Corps had been reduced to only 41 runners. [15]

Mersa Matruh fell on 29th to a thrust by 90th Light and more than 6000 prisoners were taken. With Matruh fallen the advance swept forward towards El Daba and XX Corps followed closely behind the armoured spearhead now approaching close to the Suez Canal.

Less than 2 hours drive from the point unit's position at midnight on 29 June, lay the British fleet base of Alexandria. Only 60 miles separated the African Panzer Army from the objectives for which it had been fighting for over a year but already the ground conditions were deteriorating. East of Mersa Matruh the Libyan plateau is cut by numerous steep-sided and deep wadis and the passable country begins to narrow until at El Alamein it is only 40 or so miles wide. This was a natural barrier for one flank rests on the sea and the other on the impassable sand seas of the Quattara Depression. The only route to Alexandria was across this cut-up, stony desert whose narrow width had been set with strong fortifications and extensive mine-fields. As at Gazala these fortifications were a line of mutually supporting boxes and at Alamein they pivoted around the principal box bearing that name. Into these defences streamed the remnants of 8th Army and, passing through the lines of boxes, held by fresh and untried troops the formations which had been shattered at Gazala and at Knightsbridge halted for breath and within a short time had turned, once again, at bay.

The strengths of both armies was about equal at that time, but the morale of the Panzer Army was decidedly higher than that of 8th Army for the Germans could see before them the successful end to the campaign. Leaving little time for proper planning Rommel decided to make a quick thrust in the hope of penetrating the Alamein line and planned that the heaviest blow would fall in the north while the Italian Motorised Corps carried out a feint attack in the south. A British spoiling attack came in during the afternoon of 30 June under cover of a sand-storm but 21st Panzer struck back and the British armour withdrew.

On 1 July after an all-night drive the Africa Corps was ordered into the attack at first light. Three-quarters of an hour after that time at 06.46hrs, the assault rolled with troops who were desperately tired. Rommel could see before his eyes the glittering prizes of the Middle East and drove his men on. But the British, too, realised that this was the preparation for the final battle and fought with a bitterness that was born of desperation. All through the long July day the fighting swung back and forth; the box at Bir el Schine was taken but 90th Light Division lost all its artillery without making any im­pression upon the British defenders. Throughout 2 and 3 July the battle continued and into the fight the British flung the Royal Air Force to carry out an intensive, almost continuous, bombardment of the Axis troops. British counter-attacks against the lost box were beaten off with a loss of 30 tanks and in 90th Light Division's sector the advance inched forward against fanatical opposition right to the edge of the British prepared defences. There the attack collapsed through sheer exhaustion and weakness; the strength of 90th Light had been reduced to only 58 officers, 247 non-commissioned officers, and 1023 men.