The assaults by Indian infantry and by the 22nd Armoured Brigade struck Ariete Division and forced its troops back past Bir el Aslagh and to Bir el Tamar but then 8th Panzer Regiment swept forward and the 22nd Armoured Brigade, already halted and baffled by the German gun line, was flung back by 8th Panzer Regiment with considerable loss. The 15th Panzer Division, too, had had successes and claimed no less than 50 'kills'. In the afternoon of 5 June, the tanks of 15th Panzer were moved from the bridgehead position to Bir el Harmat but 21st Panzer, which should have collaborated in the counter-attack, had been held by the British tank force which realised that is was now fighting for its life. With the tanks in front of 15th Panzer driver, back in confusion the British and Imperial infantry bore the full brunt of the German counter-attack and were overrun.

Late in the morning the assaults of the British had been driven back on both the northern and the southern sectors and the pincers of the panzer divisions storming forward in pursuit of the withdrawing armour had met and thus had cast a ring around 8th Army's tank force. During the various thrusts and advances not only had the Bir el Harmat box been overrun but the headquarters of both 5th Indian and 7th Armoured Divisions had been dis­persed while among the British units in the Trigh Bir Hachim and in the Knightsbridge area havoc had been created. Only at Bir Hachim itself was there still the iron resolve to hold out, and to reduce this troublesome box Rommel ordered that an especially strong battle group be formed and that the French were to be destroyed.

During the night of 5/6 June the British and Indian forces on the Aslagh ridge had been destroyed and the losses reported to 8th Army headquarters included not only two brigades of infantry but four regiments of artillery and more than a hundred tanks. Losses on this scale could not be accepted and it was clear that the initiative was once more in German hands. This was demonstrated by the move which 15th Panzer Division made during the afternoon of 7 June when it captured the high ground north of Knightsbridge against the determined, but uncoordinated, attacks by 22nd and by 4th Armoured Brigades. The fierce fighting of the past days had consumed a higher than normal amount of tank and artillery ammunition and the supply columns were victims of the aggressive British armoured car patrols. To combat these patrols and to ensure the safe arrival of the supply columns, Rommel detatched some of his panzer force as escort, a move which he could afford for now it was clear that the British effort was weakening. The 8th Army's attacks were becoming less strong in intensity, less frequent, and of shorter duration and among the Panzer Army staff there grew the impression that it was the British intention to draw back upon Tobruk and to commit its armour west of that town.

Upon the defenders of Bir Hachim the full force of the German attack was now concentrated. Stuka bombers attacked with monotonous regularity and the French, who had been fighting since the offensive opened, faced with bombardment from the air and from the ground, attacked by tank and infantry without cessation, had been compressed into a small perimeter. When armoured infantry from 15th Panzer Division captured a dominant feature the defence became impossible to maintain and during the night of 10/11 June the French withdrew. The evacuation of the Bir Hachim box opened the final chapter of the defeat for with its fall collapsed the British defence system. The central and southern sectors had been cleared of the British forces; only those in the Gazala sector needed to be attacked and Rommel's plan would have succeeded although its execution had not followed his time-table or sequence.

The 8th Army then pivoted back on the untouched boxes of 1st South African Division and 50th Division and formed a new line from Gazala to Knightsbridge. Once again these newly organised positions were garrisoned by infantry.

Rommei then varied his original plan by moving the area of the main thrust from west to east of Knightsbridge to intercept and catch the greatest number of the two British divisions on the northern sector. The advance began at 15:00hrs on 11 June and while 21st Panzer hemmed the battle area of the Cauldron in from the north an encircling group swung towards El Adem. This armoured fist had Trieste Division on the left wing, then 15th Panzer with the two reconnaissance battalions on its right flank, and then the motorised element of 90th Light Division. By 15:00hrs the panzer wave had reached the first objective of Naduret el Gheseauso having encountered only weak British opposition and there Rommel waited for 8th Army's counter­attack. But there was no reaction and the advance was then renewed. The 21st Panzer had, meanwhile, driven south of the box at Knightsbridge intending to attack the British armour from the rear. The battle on 12 June did not unfold with dramatic suddenness for both sides were waiting for the other to make a move. Characteristically, Rommel ordered his anti-tank gun line to close towards the British armour daring it to charge and while attention was being held there he sent the right wing of 15th Panzer Division swinging like a scythe blade towards Bir Lefa and the high ground north-west of that place. As the German tanks advanced they were opposed by tanks from 2nd and 4th Brigade and heavy fighting then ensued. At 11:00hrs, three hours after the battle opened, the 90th Light reported that it had reached El Adem and the 21st Panzer, which then came in, struck 7th Armoured Division in the flank. The whole British force was now trapped between the jaws of 15th Panzer closing in from the front and the 21st Division striking from the back. At 14:00hrs the 15th Panzer Division reported that the British from was withdrawing and two hours later announced that Bir Lefa had been taken. By last light the division had reached Point 174 on the Hagiag el Raml by which time 90th Light had attained the high ground north of El Adem. The 21st Panzer Division was given the task of covering the northern flank.

The turning point in the battle came on 12 June; the British armoured fragments had been smashed and 120 armoured fighting vehicles had been lost. The Africa Corps strength return for 11 June had given the number of runners as 124 with 60 more serving with the Italians.

Wireless intercepts indicated that the British armour had been ordered to be offensive west of the remaining boxes and in the dawn light of 13 June the 8th Army's tank regiments attacked southwards but they were seduced into the range of 8.8cm guns and destroyed. The 15th Panzer then went into a counter-attack upon Knightsbridge at 05:30hrs on 13 June but came up short against two belts of mines and remained halted while 21st Panzer, on its left flank, swung along the Rigel escarpment to the north-east of Knightsbridge. Holding position on the ridge were men of the Scots guards supported by South African field and anti-tank artillery. British armour was committed to halt the victorious advance of 21st Division's panzers but they would not be gainsaid and by 17:56hrs could report that the box on Rigel ridge had been captured.

The capture of that high ground made the defence of Knightsbridge box an impossible task and the guards brigade, or rather the remnants of it for its battle had lasted for nearly a fortnight, broke out to join the main body of 8th Army. Ritchie, the Army commander, realised that the victory which he could sense at the end of May had turned to bitter defeat. The Gazala Line would be abandoned and the Army would withdraw and rally before coming on again.

Rommel now had a clear field and flung his forces northward again to trap, within the northern sector, the South African and British divisions at Gazala. The battlefield was tidied en route by the destruction of the box at Eleut el Tamar, taken only after the most bitter fighting. Intercepts reported that the British were moving large bodies of troops from the boxes around Gazala eastwards.