There was no time for discussion of the plan nor for adequate reconnaissance and thus the units were attacking in the dark and into an area with which they were unfamiliar. Improvisation was the order of the day and an engineer officer was given the task of hand-guiding the panzers through the gap in the wire. The noise and evidence of the preparations warned the Australians of 2/17th Battalion of the impending assault and, even as the attack opened, artillery covered the approach routes with a fierce and prolonged bombardment. The engineer officer lost his way and misdirected the tanks so that they were nearly 'bellied' in the anti-tank ditch before he found the gap and the penetration could begin.
But by this time dawn had broken, the German defensive fire plan had come to a halt, and a concentrated barrage of infantry and artillery fire was being directed upon the advancing panzers and their infantry. The armour advanced slowly thrusting through the crash of shell fire and the hail of machine gun bullets, vision reduced by the dust which the explosions and their own movement had raised, and gradually they penetrated the outer defence line. The advance suddenly halted. Immediately in front of the tanks lay the inner defence line based upon the Solaro and the Palastrino forts. The British fire rose to hurricane force driving the panzers back through the gap in the wire. The infantry who had already jumped from the tanks to engage the British infantry had suffered severe losses and small groups began to move back to the start line only to find that the way was blocked by Australian troops who had driven back thp Italian Ariete. The Italians had been unable to take the strong points and British infantry had recaptured and now dominated the ground between the gap and the retreating Germans.
Bitter, and in some cases hand to hand, fighting took place as the German machine gunners tried to force their way back. A few isolated groups battled their way through to the start line where they came under more intense fire from British horse artillery batteries as well as from the uncaptured strong points on either side of the breach. The panzer column, too, suffered as it drew back through the gap in the wire.
By 10:00 hrs the attack had obviously failed but Rommel ordered the panzers to go back in again to rescue those machine gunners who were still holding out inside the perimeter wire. Bending to the pleas of the divisional commander he cancelled his order and admitted, thereby, that he had suffered his first setback in Africa, although he could assure himself that now he had a good idea of the strength of the fortress. This knowledge had been bought at a high price in men and armour for 5th Panzer Regiment's loss of 16 vehicles represented 20 per cent of its effective strength in medium machines and with the virtual destruction of three-quarters of the machine gun battalion the infantry strength of 5th Light Division had been reduced by nearly 50 per cent.
In view of this set-back the question was raised again whether it would not be better to withdraw the Axis forces back to Cyrenaica and certainly Gariboldi, the Commando Supremo, and the senior German sources tried to influence his decision but Rommel determined to hold his position and to renew the attack once his strength had been made up. Indeed he pressed for more Italian divisions to be brought up and to invest Tobruk so that he could withdraw his German units and use them offensively. Gariboldi sent forward the motorised division Trento which had landed in Tripoli only a short time before and promised other units, but retained Pavia and Bologna Divisions for use along the Cyrenaican frontier. All these Italian units were sent as separate detachments, that is to say they did not combine to form Italian Corps as one would have expected, but remained as individual units under Rommel's direct control.
By the middle of April Tobruk was completely surrounded. Brescia held the western front, Ariete the south-western line, the 5th Light was on the southern sector, and the Santa Maria was on the south-eastern sector. Manning the eastern line was the bulk of Trento Division with one battalion at Sollum. But the line around Tobruk was so thin that in many places it was nothing more than a series of posts from which to observe the garrison. Then, too, the Axis front line was so far distant from the British defensive positions that an attack could be brought under fire before it had shaken out into correct formation.
British attacks which came in after the middle of April against the Italian-held western and south-eastern sectors met with such a great measure of success that they produced crises. During one attack a whole battalion of 800 men was taken prisoner and on Trento sector the Italians gave up ground which enabled the British to enjoy first-class observation and to direct accurate and heavy artillery fire upon the Axis lines of communication. These British successes, although local in area and small in scale, demonstrated to the 8th Army the weakness of the Axis beleaguring forces and encouraged the garrison commander to increase the size of his assaults upon the weaker Italian units in the full and certain knowledge that these would almost certainly meet with success. Rommel's problems were lightened, however, on 23 April when a rifle battalion and an artillery battalion, both from 15th Panzer Division, reached Tobruk area and Rommel put them straight into the line to plug another hole which had been punched in the front of Brescia Division.
Back on the mainland of Europe there had been two differing reactions to the successes which Africa Corps had achieved. At public level there was admiration and even, perhaps, a little hope that, in place of the colonies which Germany had lost after the First World War, Rommel might carve out a new and bigger colonial Empire. At the sober and coldly intellectual level of the military high commands there was a completely different reaction. It must be understood that the German High Command, already burdened with details for the forthcoming attack upon Russia, had suddenly had off-loaded upon them a Balkan campaign to rescue Mussolini and the Italian Army. Now, on the African front, there was a general who, with limited resources, had achieved a certain measure of success but who might go on to demand more troops, tanks, and guns. Rommel had caught the public imagination and he had been Hitler's personal choice for the African command. If he were to go on to fresh victories then the drain upon Germany's manpower resources might lead to strength needed for the main Russian front being siphoned off to a side-show operation; a military cul-de-sac. In any case, Rommel had gone against the instructions of the OKH. He must be brought to heel.
Accordingly on 27 April, von Paulus, the representative from OKH arrived on a tour of inspection to assess the chances of Rommel conducting a successful defence of the Italian colonies, to discover his future intentions, and to advise him of how few were the manpower and material reserves in Germany. Impassively the trained staff man listened to the commander in the field and refused to countenance the future and strategic plans that Rommel had drawn up.
With the arrival of 15th Panzer Division units the critical manpower situation in front of Tobruk had eased slightly and Rommel had decided to reduce the fortress by mounting another attack. This would come in from the south-west, would pass through the Brescia Division, and thus from a direction completely unexpected by the British. The ground was suitable for panzer movements and a successful initial assault would gain observation points from which artillery fire could be directed during the subsequent phases of the battle. There were already large gaps in both the wire and the anti-tank ditches. May Day was the date set for the attack and by that time Rommel hoped to have gathered the strength necessary to fight a successful battle. To build up his forces without delay he requested OKH [6] to airlift the remaining infantry component of 15th Panzer Division.