Men who had been watching the intense rivalry between Galland and Molders throughout that summer were perhaps amused to see both of these legendary air fighters' totals (fifty-two and fifty-four respectively) passed by Major Helmut Wick, whose string of fifty-six successes had made him Kommodore of JG 2 (Richthofen), which he took over from Harry von Billow-Bothkamp, the First World War ace. At forty victories Wick was, like his rivals, awarded the oak leaves to the Knight's Cross.

The 25-year-old Wick was highly regarded by the lower ranks in the fighter force for his readiness to answer back to the top brass. When Wick's unit was paraded for a visit by Feldmarschall Sperrle, Wick was gently told that his ground crews were unmilitary in appearance. Wick asked his Air Fleet commander innocently if he didn't think that refuelling, rearming, and servicing the fighters, to maximize the operational status, wasn't more important than getting a haircut.

As the Battle came to an end, the most successful fighter pilot the RAF had put into the air Sergeant pilot Josef Frantisek died. The Czech, who declined to fly with the Czech Squadron, preferring to remain 'a guest' of the Poles with whom he got on so well, failed to get home. Soon after this, Wick also was killed in action. He parachuted down into the wintry waters of the Channel while his men circled, unable to save him. "It was as if a curtain went down, and the play ended," remembered one of Wick's flyers.

As already described, the importance of the German fighter squadrons became more and more evident as the battle progressed. In the later stages, the bomber fleets were greatly outnumbered by the necessary fighter escort, and the bombers' use was limited by the availability of fighters. And so it seems incomprehensible that the Luftwaffe did not provide their single-seat fighters with an external fuel tank, until the E-7 version came along too late for the battle.

The first thing that must be said is that the range and endurance of the Spitfire and Hurricane were no better than those of the Bf 109E that fought in the Battle.1 And certainly the Spitfire and Hurricane had no long-range tanks at this time. But this comparison does not take into account the role of the Luftwaffe as an offence arm, used with the army, to penetrate enemy air space. The RAF Fighter Command was designed entirely to defend Britain from foreign attackers.

Luftwaffe planners saw no need for long-range fighters because of the extraordinary fleet of Junkers Ju 52/3m, three-engined transport aircraft available to them to move

"Exact comparisons are difficult because of the varying endurance at different speeds and different heights for all three aircraft. Certainly all fuel-injection systems are theoretically more economical on fuel than carburettor engines.

The Results their support units forward to captured airfields. By this means German squadrons could leap-frog ahead, always operating from fields near to the front line.

Milch said that he had recommended the use of drop tanks for the Bf 109 fighters 'many months before," but this had been followed up too late. He says that at the Karinhall conference with Göring and the Air Fleet commanders on 15 August, this subject was raised, because 'the fighters were refusing to use the drop tanks unless they were armour plated." This is probably a reference to the curious old moulded plywood tanks which split if subjected to rain.

But Milch's allegation is nonsense. The Messerschmitt Bf 109E was not equipped with the belly shackles and the fuel lines for fitting the external fuel tank until the E-7 model. And the first example of this did not arrive until the end of August 1940. The shackles for the bomb-racks were available and in use from mid-July. These might have been adapted to hold the fuel tank but the fuel connection was more complicated. Perhaps such adaptations were made unofficially but there is no record of it, and so far no Luftwaffe orders and instructions have been discovered to support Milch's face-saving allegations.

Galland says:

With additional tanks which could be released and discarded after use, a device employed later by both sides and one which we had already tried successfully in Spain, our range could have been extended by 125 to 200 miles. At that time this would have been just the decisive extension of our penetration.

In Spain Galland had flown Heinkel He 51s with jettisonable tanks. The He 51 B was the first to have fuel leads and shackles for this purpose and was in production in late 1935.

So it seems that the lack of external tanks for the Bf 109E-3 was yet another example of Luftwaffe staff bungling and mismanagement. The RAF must remain grateful, for the 300-litre tanks that equipped the E-7 dramatically changed the potential of this fighter. With such a machine the necessary escort could have been provided for attacks against any British targets, for example, the two Rolls-Royce factories (at Derby and Crewe) then making the Merlin engines for Hurricanes and Spitfires. And the extra fuel meant extra duration, so that the fighter sweeps could have proved a far more serious threat to trains and road transport. Or the fighters could have remained over targets, to provide an air umbrella, or over fighter airfields to attack RAF fighters that were taking off or landing (when aircraft are very vulnerable).

In 1940 the Bf 109 averaged about 90 minutes' flying time. But climbing and getting into formation, as well as finding airfields on the return, meant that the German fighters never had more than about 30 minutes over English soil.

External fuel tanks would have eliminated the relay escorts that forced fighter pilots to fly four or five sorties a day, and consequently would have changed the tactical map. Luftwaffe fighter units could have been situated in Holland, beyond British radar coverage, and raids could have been flown by indirect routes over the water. Many pilots lost at sea in 1940 would have had enough fuel to get home safely and have flown again.

But instead of extra fuel, the rack under the new Bf 109E-7 usually held a bomb. This made these aircraft suitable only as nuisance raiders. Most pilots were anxious to release their bomb as soon as possible rather than risk combat while carrying it. Relegating the Bf 109E-7 to such a role demonstrated a profound misunderstanding of the importance of the single-seat fighter.

It is impossible to be sure how important was the part the British anti-aircraft guns played in the battle. Antiaircraft devices (searchlights, balloon-supported cables, etc.) are usually deterrent rather than combative, although by 1939 the German anti-aircraft units were changing that. By German standards, the British AA of 1940 was very poor. The Kerrison predictor and the Bofors guns, Britain's most efficient AA weapons (according to General Pile, the G.O.C. in C), were in a very short supply. The GL (gun-laying) radar was still not working properly, and the proximity fuse (which was later to make the guns a deadly accurate destroyer of flying bombs) was not yet invented More than one fighter pilot having a claim disallowed was told that it was being credited to the guns 'because they must be encouraged."

Only the really big guns could do much damage to any formation above 20,000 feet (which many raids were), and these really big guns were usually cemented into permanent emplacements. Some of these gun-sites saw little or no action.

As the Battle progressed, it was the airfields that got the lion's share of the AA defences. The few available Bofors guns, the precious big mobile guns, ancient Lewis machine guns, and 20-mm cannon manufactured for aircraft were all provided for airfield protection. Eventually low-level attacks by German aircraft became very hazardous. So — only too often did low-level flight by friendly aircraft.