(5) Joffre was able to place almost three quarters of his force on about half of his front to fight the battle which he hoped would be decisive.

(6) The Germans had started in 1906 with Schlieffen's plan which put the maximum force in the decisive right wing. By 1914, however, the plan had been weakened by shifting weight toward the left and to the Eastern Front. Only two-thirds of the divisions in line were in the right wing for the Battle of the Marne.

(7) By 1940, the French should have been able to do even better. The Maginot Line, much superior to the World War I forts, guarded the eastern frontier. Part of France's border with Germany then lay on the Rhine – a stronger natural barrier than the line of 1914.

(8) Of the combined French-British forces, only half were prepared to oppose a drive through Belgium. Thus, they did not save on men in the Maginot Line to be strong elsewhere or to 'build a strategic reserve. The French had placed divisions on about the same frontage in the east as they did in the north. After the German attack began, the 22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions were added to the Allied force, for a total of 135. Even with these troops, the Allies had only 62 percent of their force in the main battle compared to 74 percent at the Marne.

(9) The German situation had also improved. In 1914, General Helmuth von Moltke had only isolated forts to protect his left flank from the French while massing his own main attack on the right of his line. In 1940, the Germans were considerably better off in this respect. The Siegfried Line and part of the Rhine let them reduce the forces on the left. They took advantage of these changes and put 81 percent of their committed divisions into the main battle compared to 66 percent in 1914.

(10) Thus, the Germans did much better in 1940 than in 1914. They put an even smaller force in the south than they had before, even though they had more divisions available. At the same time, the threat there was much greater in terms of French divisions – 53 compared to 23 in 1914.

(11) The Siegfried Line not only made such economy of force possible, but it had already served Germany well during the Polish campaign. Second-line divisions were sent to man the fortifications at that time, permitting the main army to be concentrated in Poland. Even if the French and British had attacked immediately in the west, the works would have given time to redeploy the first-line forces.

(12) Both times the victor used his works to save on forces in secondary battles and to put more into the decisive fight. He thus got a superior force ratio in the main battle and accepted inferiority on less critical fronts. In one case, it was the defender who won in this way. In the other, it was the attacker.

(13) War-gaming factors, based on historical rates of advance' and force ratios, also can be used to show the use of fortifications: at theater level. In a model, Country A and the adjoining. Country В each fields a force of 300,000. Each country puts 200,000 on their common border and holds a reserve of 100,000. Should Country В decide to attack, she might do so as shown in Fig. 1.

(14) Country В has twice the strength of Country A in the main attack zone. The thrust should move at 1.8 miles per day initially. Country A could move her reserve to the north and might get a stalemate, but the fight would all be on her territory, and she would probably lose some of it.

(15) Country A has another alternative. She can execute the same maneuver as Country B, thus threatening the enemy homeland. Country A, too would expect initially to move about 1.8 miles per day. However, she might start later unless she had sufficient warning of impending attack to prepare her counter move. This capability of Country A to duplicate Country B's move may deter the latter from attacking.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2.

(16) Country B, however, can improve her capability to attack by building fortifications. She might build them only on the southern half of the front, but this would reveal her plan. Therefore, Country В probably would fortify the entire border, thus retaining the option of attacking anywhere.

(17) With Country В fortified, Country A has less capability for a countermove. If both attacks were made on the same fronts before, Country A would be expected to move only 0.4 mile per day while Country В would still gain 1.8 miles per day. For Country A to get 1.8 miles per day in her attack will now require four times the strength of the fortified troops compared to only twice the strength of unfortified defenders. This will require 'Country A to narrow her attack to one third the former frontage. Thus, the threat to Country В has been cut to 22 percent of its earlier value based on time or 33 percent based on frontage. (Fig. 2.)

(18) The works give Country В another option. She can reduce her strength in the south and increase her force ratio in the attack. If Country В cuts her strength in half, in the south, Country A could have a force radio of four there, and could again attack at 1.8 miles per day. However, Country В has a force ratio of 2.5 in her attack in the north and could be expected to move 2.4 miles per day.

(19) Country A may counter with her own forts. This brings the strategic balance back to its value before Country В began construction. There is one significant difference, however – the entire action is slowed. The mutual construction will give an advantage to the country which has the most to gain from time such as a greater mobilization potential or a greater reinforcement by allies.

(20) Of course, Country A, the defender, might have been the first to fortify. She would then have an obvious advantage over an unfortified Country В should the latter attack. Country A could form a larger mass of maneuver than could Country B. She could also conduct limited attacks from her works, preventing the enemy from reducing his strength on secondary fronts.

(21) Country В would have to take some action to restore the balance. One such action could again be the construction of fortifications.

(22) The experience of the two World Wars and the analysis of war-gaming factors lead us to the following conclusions:

– Fortifications give a country a strategic advantage over an unfortified neighbour.

– They can be used to reduce the number of troops on secondary fronts and to form a larger mobile reserve.

– Fortifications may also be used to slow enemy attacks or counterattacks, thus gaining time for the fortified country to execute the maneuver it desires.

– They are useful either on the offense or on the defense. When a potential enemy fortifies his frontier, it should not be concluded, based on that evidence alone, that he is defensively inclined.

– When both opponents fortify, the advantage goes to the country which gains greater strength with time.

Примечание: Статья опубликована в журнале Military Review, vol. XLIX No. 5, 1969. Автор – полковник У. Стюарт. Во время опубликования статьи он был начальником отдела штаба сухопутных войск США во Вьетнаме.

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