29 See Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 64.

30 For a description of this ‘ruchloser Terrorangriff auf die Zivilbevölkerung’, see Hans Brunswig, Feuersturm über Hamburg(Stuttgart, 2003), pp. 43–6.

31 See Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diariestrans. Frank Ziegler (New York, 1994), p. 172.

32 Hitler’s speech in the Berliner Sportpalast, 4 September 1940, quoted in Uwe Bahnsen and Kerstin von Stürmer, Die Stadt, die sterben sollte: Hamburg im Bombenkrieg, Juli 1943(Hamburg, 2003), p. 72.

33 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939–1945(London, 1961), vol.1, p.157.

34 These statistics are taken from John Ray, The Second World War(London, 1999), p. 95; and Neillands, Bomber War, p. 44.

35 See, for example, Churchill’s speech, 15 July 1941, claiming that the people of London would certainly wish to ‘mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us’; quoted in A. C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities(London, 2006), p. 187.

7    The Grand Alliance

1 During the German Blitz on London, Sir Arthur Harris claims that he stood on the roof of the Air Ministry watching the fires and said, in an echo of this Biblical quote, ‘Well, they are sowing the wind.’ Portal also swore at this time that ‘the enemy would get the same and more of it’. See Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive(London, 1947), pp. 51–2.

2 Stanley Baldwin’s famous quote about the bomber always getting through did not account for the difficulties of navigating at night and over thick cloud, which meant that the target was often not even found, let alone bombed. When the Butt Report was published in September 1941 it showed that even when the bombers found their targets only a third managed to bomb within five miles of it. See, for example, Robin Neillands, The Bomber War(London, 2001), p. 58.

3 Professor Pat Blackett, quoted in Max Hastings, Bomber Command(London, 1979), p. 111.

4 Quoted in ibid., p. 120.

5 See Harris, Bomber Offensive, pp. 9–69.

6 Quoted in Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 135. Harris’s memoirs have the politer version – ‘tanks that ate hay and thereafter made noises like a horse’, p. 24.

7 Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 66.

8 Quoted in Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 135.

9 Ibid, p. 135.

10 Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 52.

11 Harris, quoted in Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 147. The figure of 60 per cent was a British estimate from reconnaissance photographs – see Neillands, The Bomber War, p. 112; German estimates directly after the attack were as high as 80 per cent – see Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1948), 31 March 1942, p. 109.

12 Goebbels, Diaries, 28 April 1942, p. 142.

13 These figures are taken from Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 152.

14 Their policy as regarded the Japanese was very different. The firebombing of Tokyo in 1945 owed much to the lessons the Americans had learned from observing British area bombing, and probably resulted in more casualties than Hamburg and Dresden put together.

15 See Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth(London, 2000), p. 1.

16 Towards the end of the war the Americans themselves began to realize that their ‘pickle-barrel’ accuracy was a myth for these very reasons. See Summary Report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (European Theatre), p. 4, UK National Archives, DSIR 23/15754 and online at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/ETOSummary.html

17 Quoted in Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 182.

18 Quoted in Neillands, Bomber War, p. 201.

19 The German rumours are reported in Earl R. Beck, Under the Bombs: The German Home Front 1942–45(Lexington, 1986), p. 59; the actual figures are taken from Neillands, Bomber War, pp. 218–21.

20 Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeberg, On the Other Side, trans. and ed. Ruth Evans (London, 1979), p. 65.

21 UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

22 UK National Archives, PREM 3/11/8.

23 UK National Archives, PREM 3/11/8.

8    The British Plan

1 Theodore W. Adorno, Minima Moralia:Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben(Frankfurt am Main, 1962), chapter 19, p. 42. Adorno’s philosophical work, written during the war, is about the annihilation of the individual by society. His argument that technology only serves to distance us from our humanity applies equally to the new weapons employed by the Allies during the next few days and the civilian technologies of everyday life.

2 See the descriptions of Sir Arthur Harris’s ‘morning prayers’ in Max Hastings, Bomber Command(London, 1979), pp. 247–9; for the specific meeting that morning, see Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), pp. 97–8; and Gordon Musgrove, Operation Gomorrah(London, 1981), p. 1.

3 Bomber Command Intelligence Narrative of Operations No. 649, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

4 D Form, 24/25 July 1943, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

5 Report on German Flak Towers, Flak Disarmament Branch, Air Division BAFO (December 1946), UK National Archives, AIR 55/158.

6 See David Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe(Boston, 1973), pp. 213–14.

9    The First Strike

1 John Webster, The Duchess of Malfi, ed. C. Vaughan (London, 1913), IV, ii, 254–5.

2 Quoted by Kevin Wilson, Bomber Boys(London, 2005), p. 245.

3 The average age of British bomber crews in 1944 was twenty-three, which means that those entering training were still twenty-one (an oft-quoted figure: see, for example, http://www.specialforces.co.uk/airgunners2.htm). In the event, many crew members were much younger. Colin Harrison of 467 Squadron was a perfect example: he joined up at eighteen, and was still only twenty when he was flying over Hamburg. ‘One minute I was a schoolboy wearing a cap, next minute they called me a man and put me in an aeroplane, next minute I’m a flight sergeant.’ Interview with the author, 8 December 2004.

4 Bill McCrea, interview with the author, 8 December 2003; as a pilot with 57 Squadron, he took part in all four Hamburg raids in July and August 1943. See also his book A Chequer-Board of Nights(Preston, 2003), pp. 77–85.

5 This speech was exactly the same in briefings across the country. The advent of Window was considered such an important innovation that each intelligence officer was given an identical document that they were told to read out verbatim at briefing. See UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

6 Colin Harrison, pilot in 467 Squadron, interview with the author, 8 December 2004.

7 Bill McCrea, interview with the author, 8 December 2004.

8 Letter to the author, 1 December 2004. Kenneth Hills’s first operation with 9 Squadron was on the next Hamburg raid, on the night of 27 July 1943.

9 Quoted in Max Hastings, Bomber Command(London, 1979), p. 161.

10 While this job was usually allocated to the flight engineer, in some crews it would be the bomb-aimer or wireless operator.

11 See Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), p. 126.

12 Ibid., p. 120.

13 For exact times of all air-raid alarms, see the Hamburg Police Report, UK National Archives, AIR 20/7287, p. 13.

14 The German 2nd Fighter Division ( Jagddivision) had fighters stationed at Stade, Vechta, Wittmundhafen, Schleswig, Westerland, Wunstorf, Lüneburg, Grove, Kastrup, Aalborg, Jever, Husum, Oldenburg, Heligoland and Nordholz.

15 See Adolf Galland, The First and the Last, trans. Mervyn Savill (London, 1955), p. 209; Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 234; and Neillands, The Bomber War(London, 2001), p. 147.