Halfaya Pass was attacked at the same time and, just as the Germans had done, from two directions. Capuzzo fell to the enemy that evening. The 15. Panzer-Division was directed to attack Capuzzo on 16 June and take the fort back from the enemy.

The fighting see-sawed back and forth, with each side launching armored assaults against the other's perceived weaknesses. In one such counterattack. Oberstleutnant Cramer personally accompanied the II./Panzer-Regiment 8. He observed how one tank after another was knocked out, and the Matilda seemed impervious to his tanker's main guns. As all this was happening, i group of about 20 other tanks rapidly advanced against the left wing of the regiment.

Oberstleutnant Cramer took immediate countermeasures: "Kiimmel, turr_ and engage the approaching enemy!"

Kummel's company turned and approached the advancing enemy. His short-barreled 7.5-centimeter main guns opened fire at a short distance from the enemy.

The first Mark II went up in flames. First three, then a fourth Mark II turned towards Kummel's vehicle. With a violent impact, the first roun; thudded into the ground to the right in front of Kummel's command tank

It covered the vehicle with a fountain of dirt. The flash from the detonation lit up the interior of Kummel's tank. Before the enemy could get off a second round, however, Kummel's gunner acquired him in his sights and clobbered him with a direct hit between the turret and hull.

Kummel's crew worked like madmen. Whenever the next round was rammed home and the breechblock snapped shut, the gunner had another target in his optics. The gun reported, and the empty shell casing smashed against the round deflector and landed in the spent-casing sack. While all this was going on, driver Kruschinski was racing about madly to avoid allowing die enemy the chance to acquire them. By the end of this round of fighting, fcunmel's tank alone had accounted for eight of the enemy. From that point rorward, Johannes Kummel was known as the "Lion of Capuzzo."

Oberstkutnant Cramer ordered another turn, because enemy tanks were then attacking the regiment's right flank. At the moment that the tanks' main guns opened fire again, the regimental command tank took a direct hit. Cramer felt one blow, and then another. When he reached for his head, his h-ind became bloody. He had been wounded by shrapnel on the arm and head.

Despite his personal wounding and the loss of many tanks, the main effort of the enemy had been thwarted. Major Fenski, the com­mander of the I./Panzer- Regiment 8° had done a great job directing the efforts of the other three tank companies of the battalion. Ik addition, 8.8-centimeter Flak on and in front of Hill 208 had thwarted a series of enemy attacks by nocking out a large number of enemy tanks.

The sharp edge of "Battleaxe" bad been blunted at this hill. In the official British history of the campaign written  after  the war, the fbllowing was  stated   about the resistance offered by a single 8.8 centimeter Flak battery on the hill

Operation "Battleaxe," which had started with such high hopes, failed, because the decisive Halfaya Position had not been taken, and it was not possible to proceed past Strongpoint 208. The bravery and the firepower of the opponents was too great. The German 88 proved to be a deadly weapon against all types of tanks. The combined effort of tanks employed with 8.8-centimeter Flak batteries that were positioned well forward was a surprise for the British leadership and an important factor for its defeat. Rommel's victory was a victory of his leadership, of his soldiers, who were fighting in a superior fashion, and of his better weapons.

It should be mentioned that the success of these two days of fighting cost Panzer-Regiment 8 50 of its available 80 tanks. The majority of the tanks lost were recovered in the days that followed and made operational again, how­ever.

The 5. leichte Afrika-Division - to be redesignated the 21. Panzer-Divi­sion in August 1941 -  started to gain ground in its sector on 16 June. With its Panzer-Regiment 5 in the lead, it had attacked out of the area west of Sidi Azeiz. Generalmajor von Ravenstein was the division's new commander. Rommel told von Ravenstein: "Move as rapidly as possible to the area north­east of Sidi Omar and continue the attack from there towards Sidi Sulei­man."

This shifting of the Schwerpunkt of the operation was one of Rommel's recipes for success. He made an entry concerning it in his personal diary: "You can frequently decide a battle by simply changing the point of main effort, as long as it comes as a surprise to the enemy."

In order to make his new Schwerpunkt as strong as possible, he ordered all elements of the 15. Panzer-Division north of Capuzzo to be pulled out o: the line and moved to the left flank of the 5. leichte Afrika-Division. These elements would advance to Sidi Suleiman on the following morning and eject the enemy in conjunction with the 5. leichte Afrika-Division.

The reinforced Panzer-Regiment 5 moved out to attack at 0430 hours on 17 June. The enemy's initial resistance was overcome and Sidi Suleiman was reached and rapidly secured.

The I.Panzer-Regiment 8 of Major Fenski reached the enemy at approxi­mately the same time. It rolled into the flank of the completely surprised enemy and opened fire. After a short, sharp exchange of fire, a number or enemy tanks were left knocked out on the battlefield. Sidi Suleiman was reached by this battalion as well. The tanks continued their advance from there, passing columns of Commonwealth trucks and tanks. The enemy had been caught in a trap.

At 0925 hours, Major General Creagh, the British commander in the trap, sent a radio message to the Commander of the Western Desert Forces, General Beresford-Peirse, that he needed to come to his command post. Major General Creagh did not know how to get out of this situation.

A short while later, the elements of Panzer-Regiment 5 that had advanced further reached the command post of Brigadier General Messervy and over­ran it. That action resulted in the British 4th Armoured Brigade becoming leaderless. When General Beresford-Peirse arrived at Major General Creagh's command post accompanied by General Wavell, he ordered the retreat of the British 7th Armoured Division. General Wavell, the overall Commander-in-Chief, approved the decision. General Wavell then flew back to Cairo, where he informed London that he regretted "to report that Battleaxe had failed."

The Summer Battle of Solluni had lasted 72 hours. It was the first time that all of the 15. Panzer-Division had been employed at the same time. The Commonwealth forces pulled back to their jump-off positions. Winston Churchill wrote the following in his diary: "Everything fell apart on 17 June."

Four days later, he sent an official message to General Wavell at his headquarters in Cairo:

I have come to the decision that the best public interest is served if General Auchinleck is named as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the Near East in your place.

A second message was sent to General Auchinleck:

You are assuming this important command in a time of crisis. You shall provide special attention to the situation in Tobruk, to the bringing up of enemy reinforcements in Libya and to the fact that the Germans are now primarily occupied with the invasion of Russia. You must certainly realize yourself how important these problems are.

The war in the desert entered a period of stalemate. In its initial stages, rowever, it had demonstrated that armored formations also had great opportunities there. It also demonstrated that the question of logistical support was especially important. This would be shown more than once in the period to follow.