PART II: THE RESPONSE OF ISLAM

Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 266; Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, pp. 112–16; Hillenbrand, ‘Abominable acts: the career of Zengi’, pp. 111–32; C. Hillenbrand, ‘Jihad propaganda in Syria from the time of the First Crusade until the death of Zengi: the evidence of monumental inscriptions’, The Frankish Wars and Their Influence on Palestine, ed. K. Athamina and R. Heacock (Birzeit, 1994), pp. 60–69; H. Dajani-Shakeel, ‘Jihad in twelfth-century Arabic poetry’, Muslim World, vol. 66 (1976), pp. 96–113; H. Dajani-Shakeel, ‘Al-Quds: Jerusalem in the consciousness of the counter-crusade’, The Meeting of Two Worlds, ed. V. P. Goss (Kalamazoo, 1986), pp. 201–21.

Ibn al-Athir, vol. 1, p. 382; Hillenbrand, ‘Abominable acts: the career of Zengi’, p. 120.

Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 271–2; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 222; William of Tyre, p. 956. On Nur al-Din’s career see: H. Gibb, ‘The career of Nur ad-Din’, A History of the Crusades, vol. 1, ed. K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin (Philadelphia, 1958), pp. 513–27; N. Elisséeff, Nur al-Din: un grand prince musulman de Syrie au temps des Croisades, 3 vols (Damascus, 1967); Holt, The Age of the Crusades, pp. 42–52; Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, pp. 117–41.

Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 272; Ibn Jubayr, p. 260. In the centuries before the crusading era, Aleppo was ruled first by the Seleucids during the Hellenistic period (that followed Alexander the Great’s conquests), and then prospered for six centuries under the Romans before falling to the Arabs in 637 CE, assuming something of a secondary role to Damascus. The city’s fortunes were rejuvenated under the Iraqi Hamdanid dynasty (944–1003) and, when conquered by the Seljuq Turks in 1070, it stood as a bastion on the frontier with Byzantium.

Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 274–5; Michael the Syrian, vol. 3, p. 270; Matthew of Edessa, Continuation, pp. 244–5; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 8.

Ibn al-Athir, vol. 1, p. 350; Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 280–81.

Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 281–2. The esteemed German historian Hans Mayer went so far as to describe the attack on Damascus as ‘incredibly stupid’ and even ‘ridiculous’ (Mayer, The Crusades, p. 103). On this debate see: M. Hoch, Jerusalem, Damaskus und der Zweite Kreuzzug: Konstitutionelle Krise und äussere Sicherheit des Kreuzfahrerkönigreiches Jerusalem, AD 1126–54 (Frankfurt, 1993); M. Hoch, ‘The choice of Damascus as the objective of the Second Crusade: A re-evaluation’, Autour de la Première Croisade, ed. M. Balard (Paris, 1996), pp. 359–69; Phillips, The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom, pp. 207–18.

Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, p. 62; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 22; Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 286; ‘Die Urkunden Konrads III. und seines Sohnes Heinrich’, ed. F. Hausmann, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Diplomata, vol. 9 (Vienna, 1969), n. 197, p. 357; William of Tyre, pp. 760–70; A. Forey, ‘The Failure of the Siege of Damascus in 1148’, Journal of Medieval History, vol. 10 (1984), pp. 13–24; M. Hoch, ‘The price of failure: The Second Crusade as a turning point in the history of the Latin East’, The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences (Manchester, 2001), pp. 180–200; Phillips, The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom, pp. 218–27.

Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 39–40; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, pp. 163–4.

Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 1–4, 222–3. One source offering a modicum of balance was authored by Ibn al-Qalanisi (d. 1160), who wrote his Damascus Chronicle while living in that city during the mid-twelfth century, but even he ended up writing under Zangid rule. Ibn al-Qalanisi twice held the office of ra’is–leader of townspeople and head of the urban militia (Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 7–14). On the Arabic sources for this period see: F. Gabrieli, ‘The Arabic historiography of the crusades’, Historians of the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (London, 1962), pp. 98–107; D. S. Richards, ‘Ibn al-Athir and the later parts of the Kamil’, Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, ed. D. O. Morgan (London, 1982), pp. 76–108; A. M. Eddé, ‘Claude Cahen et les sources arabes des Croisades’, Arabica, vol. 43 (1996), pp. 89–97.

For Sir Hamilton Gibb, the renowned British scholar of Arabic history, the change came in 1149. Gibb declared that this was ‘the turning-point in [Nur al-Din’s] own conception of his mission and in the history of Muslim Syria. In the eyes of all Islam he had become a champion of the faith, and he now consciously set himself to fulfil the duties of that role’ (Gibb, ‘The career of Nur ad-Din’, p. 515). Just over a decade later, in 1967, Nikita Elisséeff published an influential three-volume biography of the ‘great Muslim prince of Syria’, refining this view. Elisséeff argued that it was only after 1154 that Nur al-Din truly was driven by authentic devotion to jihad and an overwhelming desire to reconquer Jerusalem (Elisséeff, Nur al-Din, II, p. 426). In 1991, Michael Köhler adopted a less sympathetic tone, suggesting that Nur al-Din was never truly dedicated to the struggle to reclaim the Holy City, but merely used jihad propaganda after 1157 to further his political aims (Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge, pp. 239, 277). On this issue see: Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, pp. 132–41.

On the Battle of Inab see: Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 288–94; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 31–2; William of Tyre, pp. 770–74; John Kinnamos, p. 97; Matthew of Edessa, Continuation, p. 257; Michael the Syrian, vol. 3, pp. 288–9; Abu Shama, ‘Le Livre des Deux Jardins’, RHC Or. IV–V, pp. 61–4.

Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 31–2, 36; Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 295; Gibb, ‘The career of Nur ad-Din’, pp. 515–16; Holt, The Age of the Crusades, p. 44; Mayer, The Crusades, pp. 107–8; Richard, The Crusades, p. 171; Jotischky, Crusading and the Crusader States, p. 111.

The Zangid supporter Ibn al-Athir later argued that in the early 1150s ‘Nur al-Din had no route to hinder [the Franks] because Damascus was an obstacle between [them]’. It was feared, so the chronicler asserted, that the Franks would soon occupy that ancient metropolis, because they were sucking it dry of wealth through hefty annual tribute payments that ‘their agents used to enter the city and collect…from the population’ (Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 71). Nur al-Din was only too aware of the power of these arguments and actively engaged in a propaganda war against Damascus, sponsoring the composition of poetry decrying the city’s policy of allying with the Franks. On the kingdom of Jerusalem in the period see: Mayer, ‘Studies in Queen Melisende’, pp. 95–183; M. W. Baldwin, ‘The Latin states under Baldwin III and Amalric I 1143–74’, A History of the Crusades, vol. 1, ed. K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin (Philadelphia, 1958), pp. 528–62.

Ibn al-Qalanisi, pp. 296–327. Elisséeff echoed the view that Nur al-Din prioritised the Holy War after occupying Damascus, claiming that after 1154 the emir proceeded solely ‘in the name of jihad against the crusaders and to help the revitalisation of Sunni Islam’ (Elisséeff, Nur al-Din, II, p. 426). Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, p. 134.

Ibn Jubayr, pp. 271–2, 279; R. Burns, Damascus (London, 2004), p. 169. Damascus developed around an oasis formed by a delta of the Barada River that flows out of the mountains of Lebanon. Muslims conquered the city in the seventh century CE, during the first rush of Arab-Islamic expansion, and it remained the capital of the Umayyad Empire and seat of the caliphate until 750.

Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 340; B. Hamilton, ‘The Elephant of Christ: Reynald of Châtillon’, Studies in Church History, vol. 15 (1978), pp. 97–108.