I have spoken with several thousand people… We were without exception firmly convinced that the war would be over very shortly; there was no debating this point at all; for us, after all, the decision had already been reached. There remained only the question of how and in what place of refuge we would be able to survive this brief interval. ⁴⁰

This sense of foreboding quickly spread throughout the nation. The general depression was directly comparable to the mood of the country after the defeat at Stalingrad – the difference was that, while the Stalingrad disaster had taken place more than two thousand kilometres away, Hamburg was at the heart of northern Germany. The conclusion that everyone came to was that if Hamburg could not defend itself, even though it had been one of the most heavily protected cities in the Reich, the same fate would come soon to other cities.

* * *

As far as the Allies were concerned, this gloomy atmosphere was the greatest success of all. The intention had been to undermine the morale of the German people to such a degree that they would either abandon their workplaces or rise up against their government and demand an end to the war. Until now the Allies had been unable to deliver a blow hard enough to cause such a drop in morale.

However, to produce the ‘knock-out blow’ that would win the war, the RAF would have to do as Albert Speer had warned Hitler, and follow up with the devastation of another major city. The most obvious target was Berlin, and everybody, including the Germans, expected the Allies to strike there next. The only thing that stopped them was that the nights were not yet long enough for RAF bombers to get there and back under cover of darkness – but they were lengthening, and by the end of August the Reich capital would be within range. Soon observers in Washington were giving Berlin just ‘three weeks to live’, and RAF officials in London were hinting that the city was about to get ‘the Hamburg bombing treatment’. ⁴¹

Germany was rife with similar speculation. In Berlin the people were so worried about what was coming to them that even the neutral press remarked on the change of atmosphere in the city. ‘Fear approaching panic prevails in Berlin, and the people expect the city to be laid in ruins at any moment,’ claimed one correspondent from the Swedish Aftonbladet. ⁴²He described how trenches were being dug in the parks to protect people from the effects of a possible firestorm, and how frightened civilians were fleeing the city. While the German authorities must have been dismayed at such gifts to Allied propaganda, there was nothing they could do to deny the reports. Indeed, a partial evacuation of the city had already been ordered by Goebbels himself, in his capacity as Berlin’s gauleiter: to prevent an unauthorized exodus, he had instructed women, children and non-essential civilians to leave the city at the beginning of August. When this was confirmed in an official release to the Nazi Völkischer Beobachtera few days later, the British and American press could barely contain their glee. ⁴³

With the benefit of hindsight, however, all the speculation about Berlin’s fate was hopelessly premature. The RAF could not possibly live up to what was now expected of them: the firestorm they had created in Hamburg had been a matter of chance, and would be virtually impossible to replicate in other cities. Nor were the Allies about to produce the knock-out blow that would end the war. To do so they would have had to demonstrate the power to obliterate any city they wanted at will, which meant destroying Berlin within days, not weeks, then following it up with two or three other cities for good measure. Then, perhaps, Speer’s fears might have been realized. But the RAF had no intention of even trying to accomplish such a feat. While Sir Arthur Harris cherished hopes of teaming up with the USAAF to ‘wreck Berlin from end to end’, he would not make the attempt until the winter of 1943–4. ⁴⁴In the meantime, there were few suitable alternatives for a second strike: to find new targets of even half Hamburg’s size they would have had to fly as far as Breslau or Dresden – but during the short summer nights that would have posed too great a risk for RAF crews. ⁴⁵In the end, therefore, the concept of a knock-out blow was nothing more than a mirage.

In the absence of other targets, the RAF contented themselves with bombing those cities in western Germany that were within easy reach. There was nothing new about attacking Essen, Remscheid or Mannheim – they had all been hit during the battle of the Ruhr earlier in the year – but Bomber Command Headquarters felt it better to attack something than nothing. While important cities like Berlin were still out of range, the RAF might at least destroy the industrial plants in familiar targets that had been missed on earlier visits.

With this in mind, Harris decided that he would finish the job he had started on Saturday night. On the morning of Thursday, 29 July, he ordered a third massive strike against Hamburg. If he could not finish the war by bombing, for now he would content himself with finishing off, once and for all, what was left of the city on the Elbe.

18. Coup de Grâce

I am in blood

Stepp’d in so far that, should I wade no more,

Returning were as tedious as go o’er

William Shakespeare, Macbeth ¹

Everybody in Hamburg knew that another raid was coming. In the areas that had not yet been hit, people stowed their most prized possessions in basements and cellars, in the vain hope that they might be spared when the bombs fell. Anything portable was piled into cars, wagons or even prams, and the roads were soon jammed with people carting their belongings out of the city. Many travelled on foot, content to get themselves and their families away with little more than a suitcase between them. The single thought that occupied their minds was to get as far away from the city as possible.

While the exodus of civilians accelerated, there was also significant movement in the opposite direction. Not only were the emergency services pouring men and equipment into Hamburg, but the Luftwaffe was doing all it could to bolster the city’s defences. Mobile flak units were brought to the outskirts of Hamburg by train from all around, and huge numbers of searchlights arrived. Fire-fighters worked ceaselessly to control the flames before the Allies could return to stoke them, certain that the bombers would indeed be back. It was now merely a matter of time.

Whenever the air-raid alarm sounded, everyone made directly for their shelters. The relaxed atmosphere that had prevailed a week ago was now a thing of the past, and there was a new, frightened urgency to everyone’s actions. On Wednesday night, not even twenty-four hours after the firestorm, the sirens sounded and there was an immediate rush for the bunkers. It was a false alarm – the RAF were resting their crews, and had merely sent four Mosquitos over the city on a nuisance raid – but it meant that the remnants of Hamburg’s exhausted population were deprived of sleep for a fifth night in a row. The next day there were no fewer than five major alarms, which repeatedly threw the rescue and evacuation effort into chaos. Some were caused by British reconnaissance planes, but the most serious one was brought about by a large force of American B-17s heading for the area. It turned out that the USAAF were flying on to Kiel, so Hamburg was spared for another few hours, but its people remained in a state of high anxiety for the rest of the day.

Although it was aimed at a different city, this last American raid had an unforeseen effect on Hamburg. Afraid that disaster was about to overtake Kiel, the authorities suddenly withdrew all the motorized Air Protection battalions that had been drafted into Hamburg and sent them northwards. In their absence, fires that had been half extinguished flared up, and the Hamburg fire service was hopelessly stretched again. The authorities had allowed panic to get the better of them, and for several hours in the middle of the day confusion reigned before the units were sent back to where they were most needed. ²