27 Ibid., p. 64.

28 Galland, The First and the Last, p. 239.

29 Margret Klauβ, in Uwe Bahnsen and Kerstin von Stürmer, Die Stadt, p. 60.

30 Hiltgunt Zassenhaus, in Hage (ed.), Hamburg 1943, p. 160.

31 Hannah Hyde (née Voss) interview, IWM Sound Archive 10380/5.

32 New York Times, 6 August 1943, p. 4.

33 Friedrich Reck, Tagebuch eines Verzweifelten(Frankfurt am Main, 1994), 20 August 1943, p. 216.

34 Ernst-Günter Haberland, in Kerstin Hof (ed.), Rothenburgsort 27/28 Juli 1943(unpublished booklet), Stadtteilinitiative Hamm e. V., p. 80.

35 See, for example, W. G. Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction(London, 2003), p. 89. Sebald interviewed a woman who had been a volunteer helper at Stralsund railway station when a train full of refugees arrived. Several of the women on it brought their dead children with them.

36 Nossack, Der Untergang, p. 26.

37 For the difficult relationships that developed between refugees and their hosts, see ibid., pp. 26–9. For an example of one of the rare exceptions to the general charity extended to refugees, see FZH 292–8, T–H: when Herbert Wulff and his family knocked on a door in Lauenburg to ask if they could have some water to brew coffee the door was slammed in their faces with the words ‘We are not a hotel!’

38 Story recounted by Luise Solmitz, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 62.

39 Erich Titschak, in ibid., pp. 78–9.

40 Nossack, Der Untergang, p. 62.

41 ‘Berlin Given “3 Weeks to Live” by U.S.’, Daily Mail, 4 August 1943, p. 1; RAF press conference, in New York Herald Tribune, 6 August 1943, p. 3.

42 Quoted in Daily Express, 2 August 1943, p. 1. See also Daily Mail, 2 August 1943, pp. 1 and 4; The Times, 2 August 1943, p. 4; New York Times, 2 August 1943, pp. 1 and 3; Washington Post, 2 August 1943, pp. 1 and 2.

43 See, for example, ‘Stampede Out of Berlin Is Reported’, Washington Post, 7 August 1943, pp. 1 and 2; ‘German Life is Badly Disrupted by Air War’, New York Times, 8 August 1943, p.E3; ‘Evacuation of Berlin’, Manchester Guardian, 7 August 1943, p. 5; ‘Berlin Evacuates: Official’, Daily Express, 2 August 1943, pp. 1 and 4.

44 While Harris firmly believed that the key to winning the war was the destruction of the Reich capital, it seems he thought this would happen by bombing the target in isolation, rather than by destroying it in quick succession with other cities. See his letter to Churchill, 3 November 1943: ‘We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USA will come in on it. It will cost us between 400 and 500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war.’ Quoted in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945, vol. II (London, 1961), p. 48.

45 See Sir Arthur Harris’s own memoirs, Bomber Offensive(London, 1947), p. 180.

18    Coup de Grâce

1 William Shakespeare, Complete Works, ed. Peter Alexander (London 1951), Macbeth, III, iv, 136–8.

2 See Hamburg Police Report, p. 34; and Hans Brunswig, Feuersturm über Hamburg(Stuttgart, 2003), p. 248.

3 Statistics taken from Roger Freeman, The Mighty Eighth(London, 1986), p. 66, and Roger Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Diary(London, 1990), pp. 80–82.

4 While Zero Hour that night was fifteen minutes earlier than before, at 0045, the slightly shorter route meant that take-off and return times did not vary much from previous operations on Hamburg. The first turning point was at 54.30N 07.00E, exactly as it had been on 27 July. The second was at 54.03N 09.44E, very close to that of 24 July (53.55N 09.45E), which meant that the approach into Hamburg was only slightly more northerly than it had been on that night. After leaving the target their next turning point was at 53.23N 09.38E, which was about midway between those used on the two previous attacks (53.15N 10.00E on 24 July, and 53.20N 09.30E on 27 July). Once out at sea again, their final turning point was identical to that used on Tuesday, 27 July: 54.20N 07.00E. See the various operational plans of attack in UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

5 The decoys were dropped at 53.33N 07.33E, about thirty miles along the coast west from Cuxhaven. For the route of these four Mosquitos see Interceptions/Tactics document no. 155/43 for 29/30 July, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

6 UK National Archives, AIR 27/796.

7 For a discussion of how the advent of Window changed German nightfighter tactics, see Peter Hinchliffe, The Other Battle(Shrewsbury, 2001), pp. 154–61.

8 The Hamburg Police Report mentions a ‘second strong wave of bombers approaching from the direction of Bremen’. Martin Middle-brook also mentions that one of the Mosquitos attracted the attention of a German night fighter, but there is no record of this in the official summary of combats and enemy aircraft encountered: Interceptions/Tactics document no. 155/43, 29/30 July, UK National Archives,

AIR 24/257. See Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), p. 286.

9 The losses around the route markers were as follows: a 78 Squadron Halifax piloted by Sergeant R. Snape, a 61 Squadron Lancaster (Phillips), a Halifax from 51 Squadron (Fletcher), and a Halifax from 102 Squadron (Gaston) went down in the sea (the last one a long way from the route markers, as far south as Heligoland); a 7 Squadron Stirling (Forbes) and a 467 Squadron Lancaster (Park) were lost without trace, presumably also at sea; a Halifax from 158 Squadron (MacDonald) was shot down just after crossing the coast.

10 See Interceptions/Tactics document no. 155/43, 29/30 July, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

11 UK National Archives, AIR 27/796. Middlebrook also interviewed Pickles’s navigator on this operation: The Battle of Hamburg, pp. 285–6.

12 These were probably Sutton’s Halifax from 77 Squadron, Macquarie’s Halifax from 102 Squadron and Fraser’s Halifax from 78 Squadron. See W. R. Chorley, Bomber Command Losses vol. 4 (1943)(Hersham, 2004), pp. 247–51.

13 These were: a 9 Squadron Lancaster piloted by Flight Lieutenant C. W. Fox, a Wellington of 166 Squadron (Birbeck), and a Lancaster of 57 Squadron (Parker), which was one of those that arrived late on the target (see p. 256).

14 Six bombers were shot down by fighters in this area: a 460 Squadron Lancaster piloted by Flight Sergeant H. L. Fuhrmann, a 428 Squadron Halifax (Bates), a 432 Squadron Wellingon (Kerby), a 35 Squadron Halifax (Spooner), a 97 Squadron Lancaster (Schnier) and a 57 Squadron Lancaster (Allwright, who arrived late on target – see p. 256). Those hit by both flak and fighters were a Stirling of 218 Squadron, piloted by Sergeant J. Clark, a Halifax of 35 Squadron (Pexton) and a Stirling of 218 Squadron (Pickard).

15 Quoted by Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, p. 289.

16 According to the 1 Group summary. Fifty-eight of 1 Group’s Lancasters were in the final wave of the attack so saw the fires when they were approaching their brightest. See UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

17 Bill McCrea, A Chequer-Board of Nights(Preston, 2003), pp. 80–81.

18 All statistics quoted are from the RAF Operations Record Book Appendices, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257. The last four planes to be destroyed were probably from 76 Squadron (Bjercke), 460 Squadron (Johnson), 214 Squadron (Shann) and 97 Squadron (Marks).

19 Generaloberst Weise was originally sceptical of the worth of Herrmann’s Wilde Saufighters, but was won over by their successes in this period. For a discussion of this, and for the text of his order on 30 July 1943, see Hinchliffe, Other Battle, pp. 131 and 159–160.