When about to depart from Corunna, the duke got intelligence from an English fisherman, that our fleet had lately been at sea, but had put back again and discharged most of their men, as not expecting the Spanish armada this year. This intelligence occasioned the duke to alter his resolutions, and to disobey the instructions given him by the king; yet this was not done without some difficulty, as the council was divided in opinion, some holding it best to observe the kings commands, while others were anxious not to lose the opportunity of surprising our fleet at unawares, when they hoped to burn and destroy them. Diego Flores de Valdes, who commanded the squadron of Andalusia, and on whom the duke most relied, because of his judgment and experience in maritime affairs, was the main cause of persuading to make the attempt upon our ships in harbour, and in that design they directed their course for England.

The first land they fell in with was the Lizard, being the most southerly point of Cornwall, which they mistook for the Ram-head off Plymouth; and as the night was at hand, they tacked out to sea, laying their account to make an attempt upon our ships in Plymouth next morning. In the mean time, while thus deceived in the land, they were discovered by captain Fleming, a pirate or freebooter who had been roving at sea, and who knowing them to be the Spanish fleet, repaired in all haste to Plymouth, and gave notice to our fleet then, riding at anchor, as follows:

THE ENGLISH FLEET346.

Ships – Commanders (Tons Guns Men)

The Ark Royal – The Lord Admiral (800 32 400)

Revenge – Sir F. Drake, vice admiral

Victory – Sir J. Hawkins, rear admiral (800 52 400)

Lion – Lord Thomas Howard (500 80 250)

Bear – Lord Sheffield (900 40 500)

Elizabeth-Jonas – Sir Robert Southwell (900 40 500)

Triumph – Sir Martin Frobisher (1000 40 500)

Hope – Captain Crosse (600 30 250)

Bonaventure – Captain Reyman (600 30 250)

Dreadnought – Captain George Beeston (400 20 200)

Nonparielle – Captain Thomas Fenner (500 50 250)

Swiftsure – Captain William Fenner (400 20 200)

Rainbow – Lord Henry Seymour

Vauntguard – Sir William Wentworth

Mary-Rose – Captain Fenton

Antilope – Sir Henry Palmer (350 16 160)

Foresight – Captain Baker (300 16 160)

Aid – Captain John Wentworth

Swallow – Captain Richard Hawkins (330 16 160)

Tiger – Captain William Wentworth (200 12 100)

Scout – Captain Ashley (120 8 66)

Bull

Tremontanny (– 8 70)

Acatice (100 8 60)

Charles, pinnace Captain Roberts

Moon – Captain Clifford

Spy – Captain Bradbury (50 5 40)

Noy

Immediately on receiving the intelligence brought by Fleming, the lord admiral got out his ships to sea with all possible expedition; so that before the Spaniards could draw near Plymouth, they were welcomed at sea by the lord admiral and his fleet, who continued to fight with them till they came to anchor at Calais. The particulars of the fight and its success I purposely omit, being things so well known347.

While this great armada was preparing, her majesty had frequent and perfect intelligence of the designs of the Spaniards; and knowing that the king of Spain intended to invade England by means of a mighty fleet from his own coast, she caused her royal navy to be fitted out under the conduct of the lord high admiral of England, whom she stationed at Plymouth as the fittest place for attending their coming. Knowing however, that it was not the Armada alone which could endanger the safety of England, as it was too weak for any enterprise on land, without the assistance of the Prince of Parma and his army in Flanders, she therefore appointed thirty ships of the Hollanders to lie at anchor off Dunkirk, where the prince and his army were to have embarked in flat bottomed boats, which were built on purpose and all in readiness for the expedition to England. Thus by the wise precautions of the queen, the prince was effectually prevented from putting to sea with his flat boats; but in truth neither his vessels nor his army were in readiness, which caused the king of Spain to be jealous of him ever after, and is supposed to have hastened his end.

Although her majesty had taken the most vigilant precautions to foresee and prevent all dangers that might threaten from sea, yet did she not deem herself and country too secure against the enemy by these means, and therefore prepared a royal army to receive them in case of landing. But it was not the will of God that the enemy should set foot on England, and the queen became victorious over him at sea with small hazard, and little bloodshed of her subjects. Having thus shewn the designs of the Spaniards, and the course pursued by the queen to prevent them, I propose now to consider the errors committed on both sides348.

Nothing could appear more rational or more likely to happen, after the Duke of Medina Sidonia had got intelligence of the state of our navy, than a desire to surprise them at unawares in harbour; since he well knew, if he had taken away or destroyed our strength at sea, that he might have landed when and where he pleased, which is a great advantage to an invading enemy: Yet, admitting it to have had the effect he designed, I see not how he is to be commended for infringing the instructions he had received from his sovereign. That being the case, it is easy to appreciate what blame he deserved for the breach of his instructions, when so ill an event followed from his rashness and disobedience. It was not his want of experience, or his laying the blame on Valdes, that excused him at his return to Spain, where he certainly had been severely punished, had not his wife obtained for him the royal favour.

Before the arrival in Spain of the ships that escaped from the catastrophe of this expedition, it was known there that Diego Flores de Valdes had persuaded the duke to infringe the royal instructions. Accordingly, the king had given strict orders in all his ports, wherever Valdes might arrive, to apprehend him, which was executed, and he was carried to the castle of Santander, without being permitted to plead in his defence, and remained there without being ever seen or heard of afterwards; as I learned from his page, with whom I afterwards conversed, we being both prisoners together in the castle of Lisbon. If the directions of the king of Spain had been punctually carried into execution, then the armada had kept along the coast of France, and had arrived in the road of Calais before being discovered by our fleet, which might have greatly endangered the queen and realm, our fleet being so far off at Plymouth. And, though the Prince of Parma had not been presently ready, yet he might have gained sufficient time to get in readiness, in consequence of our fleet being absent. Although the prince was kept in by the thirty sail of Hollanders, yet a sufficient number of the dukes fleet might have been able to drive them from the road of Dunkirk and to have possessed themselves of that anchorage, so as to have secured the junction of the armada and the land army; after which it would have been an easy matter for them to have transported themselves to England. What would have ensued on their landing may be well imagined.

But it was the will of HIM who directs all men and their actions, that the fleets should meet, and the enemy be beaten, as they were, and driven from their anchorage in Calais roads, the Prince of Parma blockaded in the port of Dunkirk, and the armada forced to go about Scotland and Ireland with great hazard and loss: Which shews how God did marvellously defend us against the dangerous designs of our enemies. Here was a favourable opportunity offered for us to have followed up the victory upon them: For, after they were beaten from the road of Calais, and all their hopes and designs frustrated, if we had once more offered to fight them, it is thought that the duke was determined to surrender, being so persuaded by his confessor. This example, it is very likely, would have been followed by the rest. But this opportunity was lost, not through the negligence or backwardness of the lord admiral, but through the want of providence in those who had the charge of furnishing and providing for the fleet: For, at that time of so great advantage, when they came to examine into the state of their stores, they found a general scarcity of powder and shot, for want of which they were forced to return home; besides which, the dreadful storms which destroyed so many of the Spanish fleet, made it impossible for our ships to pursue those of them that remained. Another opportunity was lost, not much inferior to the other, by not sending part of our fleet to the west of Ireland, where the Spaniards were of necessity to pass, after the many dangers and disasters they had endured. If we had been so happy as to have followed this course, which was both thought of and discoursed of at the time, we had been absolutely victorious over this great and formidable armada. For they were reduced to such extremity, that they would willingly have yielded, as divers of them confessed that were shipwrecked in Ireland.