All this had brought us quite a way from the Jews. “Ah yes, the Chosen People. Even with all these obstacles, an equitable solution remained possible. For instance, after our victory over France, the SD, in conjunction with the Auswärtiges Amt, began to think seriously about a Madagascar option. Before that, we had envisaged parking all the Jews around Lublin, in a kind of large reservation where they could have lived quietly without posing any risks for Germany; but the Generalgouvernement categorically refused, and Frank, taking advantage of his connections, managed to have the project shelved. But Madagascar was serious. We carried out studies, there was room there for all the Jews within our sphere of control. We went very far in our planning, we even had employees of the Staatspolizei vaccinated against malaria, in preparation for their departure. It was mostly Amt IV that headed the project, but the SD provided information and ideas, and I read all the reports.”—“Why didn’t it come about?”—“Quite simply because the British, very unreasonably, refused to accept our crushing superiority and sign a peace treaty with us! Everything depended on that. First of all because France had to cede Madagascar to us, which would have figured in the treaty, and also because England would have had to contribute its fleet, isn’t that so?”

Ohlendorf paused to go ask his orderly for another pot of coffee. “Here too, in Russia, the initial idea was much more limited. Everyone thought the campaign would be short and we planned to do what we did in Poland, that is, decapitate the leaders, the intelligentsia, the Bolshevist chiefs, all the dangerous men. A horrible task in itself, but vital and logical, given the excessive character of Bolshevism, its absolute lack of scruples. After the victory, we could have once again considered a global, final solution, creating for instance a Jewish reservation in the North or in Siberia, or sending them to Birobidjan, why not?”—“It’s a horrible task whatever the case,” I said. “Can I ask you why you accepted? With your rank and your abilities, you could have been more useful in Berlin.”—“Of course,” he replied briskly. “I’m neither a soldier nor a policeman, and this minion’s work doesn’t suit me. But it was a direct order and I had to accept. And also, as I told you, we all thought it would last a month or two, no more.” I was surprised that he answered me so frankly; we had never had such an open conversation. “And after the Vernichtungsbefehl?” I went on. Ohlendorf didn’t reply right away. The orderly brought the coffee; Ohlendorf offered me some more: “I’ve had enough, thanks.” He remained plunged in his thoughts. Finally he replied, slowly, choosing his words carefully. “The Vernichtungsbefehl is a terrible thing. Paradoxically, it’s almost like an order from the God of the Jews’ Bible, isn’t it? Now go and strike Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass. You know that, it’s in the first Book of Samuel. When I received the order, that’s what I thought about. And as I told you, I believe that it’s a mistake, that we should have had the intelligence and ability to find a more…humane solution, let’s say, one more in agreement with our conscience as Germans and as National Socialists. In that sense, it’s a failure. But you also have to look at the realities of war. The war goes on, and every day that this enemy force remains behind our lines reinforces our adversary and weakens us. It’s a total war, all the forces of the nation are involved in it, and we can’t afford to neglect any means to victory, any. That’s what the Führer understood clearly: he cut the Gordian knot of doubts, hesitations, divergent interests. He did it, as he does everything, to save Germany, aware that if he can send hundreds of thousands of Germans to their deaths, he can and must also send to theirs the Jews and all our other enemies. The Jews are praying and striving for our defeat, and so long as we haven’t won we can’t nourish such an enemy in our midst. And for us, who have received the heavy burden of carrying out this task to the end, our duty toward our people, our duty as true National Socialists, is to obey. Even if obedience is the knife that guts the will of man, as St. Joseph of Cupertino said. We have to accept our duty in the same way that Abraham accepts the unimaginable sacrifice of his son Isaac demanded by God. You’ve read Kierkegaard? He calls Abraham the knight of faith, who must sacrifice not only his son, but also and especially his ethical principles. For us it’s the same, isn’t that so? We have to accomplish Abraham’s sacrifice.”

Ohlendorf, I could tell from what he said, would have preferred not to have been placed in this position; but who, these days, had the good fortune to do what he preferred? He had understood this and accepted it lucidly. As a Kommandant, he was strict and conscientious; unlike my old Einsatzgruppe, which had quickly abandoned this impractical method, he insisted that executions be conducted according to the military method, with a firing squad, and he often sent his officers, such as Seibert or Schubert, on inspection to make sure the Kommandos were respecting his orders. He also insisted on curbing as much as possible all acts of theft or misappropriations by the soldiers in charge of the executions. Finally, he had strictly forbidden anyone to strike or torment the condemned; according to Schubert, these orders were followed as well as they could be. Aside from that, he always sought to take positive initiatives. The previous autumn, in collaboration with the Wehrmacht, he had organized a brigade of Jewish artisans and farmers to bring in the harvest, near Nikolaev; he was forced to put an end to this experiment on direct orders from the Reichsführer, but I knew that he regretted that, and in private he regarded the order as a mistake. In the Crimea, he had invested himself in developing relations with the Tatar population, with considerable success. In January, when the Soviets’ surprise offensive and the capture of Kerch had put our whole position in the Crimea in danger, the Tatars, spontaneously, placed a tenth of their male population at Ohlendorf’s disposal to help defend our lines; they also provided considerable help to the SP and the SD in the anti-partisan struggle, handing over to us those they captured, or liquidating them themselves. The army appreciated this assistance, and Ohlendorf’s efforts in this area had contributed a lot to improving his relations with the AOK, after the conflict with Wöhler. Still, he was hardly at ease in his role; and I wasn’t unduly surprised when, immediately upon Heydrich’s death, he began to negotiate his return to Germany. Heydrich was wounded in Prague on May 29 and died on June 4; the next day, Ohlendorf flew to Berlin to attend the funeral; he returned in the second half of the month promoted to SS-Brigadeführer and with a promise of a rapid replacement; as soon as he got back, he began making his farewell rounds. One evening, he briefly told me how it had happened: four days after Heydrich’s death, the Reichsführer had called him to a meeting with most of the other Amtschefs, Müller, Streckenbach, and Schellenberg, to discuss the future of the RSHA, and the very ability of the RSHA to continue as an independent organization without Heydrich. The Reichsführer had chosen not to replace Heydrich right away; he himself would be in charge during the interim, but from a distance; and this decision required the presence of all the Amtschefs in Berlin, to supervise directly their Ämter in Himmler’s name. Ohlendorf’s relief was obvious; beneath his customary reserve, he seemed almost happy. But that was scarcely noticed amid the general excitement: we were on the point of launching our big summer campaign in the Caucasus. Operation Blue got under way on June 28 with Bock’s offensive on Voronej; two days later, Ohlendorf’s replacement, Oberführer Dr. Walter Bierkamp, arrived in Simferopol. Ohlendorf wasn’t leaving alone: Bierkamp had brought his own adjutant with him, Sturmbannführer Thielecke, and the plan was to replace most of the veteran officers of the Gruppenstab, as well as the leaders of the Kommandos, during the summer, according to the availability of their replacements. At the beginning of July, in the enthusiasm generated by the fall of Sebastopol, Ohlendorf gave us an eloquent departure speech, invoking, with his natural dignity, all the grandeur and difficulty of our deadly fight against Bolshevism. Bierkamp, who came to us from Belgium and France, but who before had headed the Kripo in Hamburg, his native city, then served as IdS in Düsseldorf, spoke a few words to us. He seemed very satisfied with his new position: “The work in the East, especially in wartime, is the most challenging possible for a man,” he declared. By profession, he was a jurist and a lawyer; his statements, during his speech and the reception that followed, revealed a policeman’s mentality. He must have been about forty and was stocky, a little short-legged, with a sly look; despite his doctorate, he was definitely not an intellectual, and his language mixed Hamburg slang with SP jargon; but he seemed determined and capable. I saw Ohlendorf again only one more time after that evening, during the banquet offered by the AOK to celebrate the fall of Sebastopol: he was busy with the army officers, and spent a long time conversing with von Manstein; but he wished me good luck, and invited me to come see him whenever I was in Berlin.