Franklin's best-known efforts as a propagandist focused on generating dissatisfaction among mercenaries from what is now Germany who were serving with the British forces in America, and on exposing British human rights violations committed against Americans. In 1777, he concocted a letter, supposedly written by a Prussian Prince to the commander of the Prince's mercenary troops serving with the British forces in America. The letter questioned casualty figures provided by the British Government to the Prince. According to the letter, the Prince believed that the actual figures were higher and that he was being cheated of payments due him for dead and wounded soldiers.

The contrived letter also advised the commander to let his wounded soldiers die because the British would pay more for a death than for a wounded soldier. Wounded soldiers, the letter concluded, were of no use to the Prince; they were merely "cripples", unable to serve. The letter was widely circulated in Europe and among Prussian troops in the colonies, and was credited with causing numerous desertions. It also prompted protests within Britain against the payment of "blood money" to foreigners who "sold" their subjects to the British Government.

Another example of Franklin's handiwork was a forged copy of a 1782 edition of a Boston newspaper, complete with actual advertisements and local news. The paper contained an article that said the British Royal Governor of Canada was paying his Indian allies for each American scalp provided to him. The article also noted that many of the scalps "sold" to the Governor were from women and children. This story touched off a public uproar in Britain and was used by opposition Whig politicians there to attack the conduct of the war.

In the field of paramilitary operations, Franklin coordinated the efforts of dozens of privateers operating out of French and other European ports against British shipping. He convinced the French Government to ignore its neutrality obligations regarding these activities, and he negotiated a secret arrangement permitting the privateers to sell their captured British ships and cargo to French merchants.

Franklin also established a system of American port agents to handle re-supply, refitting, crew recruitment, and disposal of captured goods and ships. This network—referred to by some as "Franklin's Navy"—produced military, economic, and psychological benefits for the American cause. Money generated by these activities was utilized by the Americans to purchase military supplies and European ships for colonial naval use and for refitting captured ships. In the economic/financial realm, frequent attacks on British shipping were driving up maritime insurance rates, making business less profitable for the politically influential British merchant class. These attacks also made the consequences of the war in North America more real for the British public.

Franklin, moreover, played a role in the only American military attack on the British Isles during the Revolutionary War period. In April 1778, Captain John Paul Jones, who later became one of America's most famous naval heroes, raided the British port of Whitehaven. Franklin and Jones had planned to burn the hundreds of ships crowded in the port's anchorage. But once the attackers were ashore, the element of surprise was lost and they had to make a hasty retreat after partially burning only one ship and spiking a few cannon. The British later estimated the cost of the damage at no more than 250-300 pounds. The raid nonetheless was an important achievement for America in terms of propaganda and morale. A British town had been invaded for the first time since the late 1600s. The attack aggravated concerns about insecurity in ports all along he British coast. It also triggered a new hike in shipping insurance rates and sparked considerable anxiety in the British shipping industry.

Conclusion

Thus the practice of American intelligence in its various forms is readily traceable to the earliest days of the nation's existence. The Founding Fathers—particularly the three who form the central focus of this booklet—fully recognized that intelligence is as vital an element of national defense as a strong military. Their intelligence operations typically were disciplined and well-focused and were designed to support specific national objectives. And, for the most part, these activities were hidden from public view; the Founding Fathers understood the importance of secrecy for conducting effective intelligence operations.

Then, as now, it was clear to American decisionmakers that skilled and motivated intelligence officers, led by people of vision and courage, are essential to the security and well-being of the United States.

ANNEX

Recommended Reading

• Ashcraft, Major Allan C., "General George Washington and the Evolution of a Military Intelligence Service During the American Revolution" Section One, "A History of Military Intelligence in the United States Army." Research project. (837th M.I.D., 511 Carson Street, Bryan, Texas 77801, 1969)

• Alsop, Susan Mary, Yankees at the Court: The First Americans in Paris (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1982)

• Andrew, Christopher, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995)

• Augur, Helen, The Secret War of Independence (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1955)

• Bakeless, John E., Turncoats, Traitors and Heros (Philadelphia: J.B.Lippincott Company, 1959)

• Bakeless, Katherine and John, Spies of the Revolution (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1962)

• Barch, Dorothy C. (Editor), Minutes of the Committee and First Commission for Detecting Conspiracies (New York: The New York Historical Society, 1924)

• Bidwell, Bruce W., History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of Army General Staff, 1775 - 1941 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986)

• Butterfield, Lyman, "Psychological Warfare in 1776: The Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions" Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 94, No.3, June 1950

• Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence in the War of Independence" (Washington: CIA Office of Public Affairs, 1976)

• Clark, William Bell: Ben Franklin's Privateers (New York: Greenwood Press, 1956)

• Crosby, Enoch, Deposition dated 15 October 1832 to the Clerk of Putnam County, as reprinted in Barnum, H.L., The Spy Unmasked (Harrison, New York: Harbor Hill Books, 1975)

• Crary, Catherine Snell, "The Tory and the Spy: The Double Life of James Rivington" William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 16, No.1 (January 1959)

• Davidson, Philip, Propaganda and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1941)

• Flexner, James Thomas, George Washington in the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967)

• Ford, Corey, A Peculiar Service: A Narrative of Espionage in and Around New York During the American Revolution (Boston, Little Brown, 1965)

• Groh, Lynn, The Culper Spy Ring (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969)

• Hall, Charles S., Benjamin Tallmadge: Revolutionary Soldier and American Statesman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943)

• Johnston, Henry P., "The Secret Service of the Revolution" The Magazine of American History, Vol. 8, No. 2, February 1882.

• Kitman, Marvin, George Washington's Expense Account (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970).

• Kleber, Louis C., "Jones Raids Britain" History Today, Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1969