Before leaving Lima, he sent off messengers to Cuzco by way of the mountain, but chose to march by the route of the plain or low country of Peru to Arequipa, exacting money from the inhabitants wherever he passed. At Arequipa he received letters from the magistrates of Cuzco and De Toro, earnestly requesting his immediate presence in that city; whence, as being the capital of the kingdom, it was proper that the army should march against the rebels. They assured him of being there provided with considerable reinforcements of men arms and horses, and that all the principal persons of the city were ready to accompany him on the expedition: adding, that being himself a citizen of Cuzco it seemed reasonable he should honour that city by his presence. By these and other considerations he was induced to march for Cuzco, though still entertaining some distrust and even fear of Toro, who he was informed had often spoken against him in his absence. When De Toro was informed of the approach of Carvajal to Cuzco, he made every necessary preparation for reinforcing the army, and providing for the intended expedition against Centeno; yet could not conceal his dissatisfaction, that he who had begun the war, and had already suffered great fatigues, and even had gained material advantages, should be superseded by another commander whom he must now obey, and more especially that it should be Carvajal who was put over him, with whom he had been already engaged in disputes. He dissembled however as much as possible, and concealed his resentment, saying publickly that his only wish was for the fortunate management of affairs, whoever might command. Yet with all his caution, he could not so carefully conceal his sentiments, but that he occasionally dropped expressions of resentment.
The discontent of De Toro was well known to the inhabitants of Cuzco, yet they were in hopes that Carvajal would set every thing to rights on his arrival. Carvajal having arrived in the neighbourhood of the city, which he was to enter next day at the head of two hundred men, part cavalry and part musqueteers, De Toro was very anxious to muster all that were able to carry arms; and from this measure, and the precautions he took that every one should be in the most perfect equipment, and the troops steady in their ranks, it was suspected that he entertained some evil design. De Toro was thus posted with his troops, as if in ambush, in the way by which Carvajal had to march into the city. As these circumstances were made known to Carvajal, he ordered his troops to march in close array, and even ordered their arms to be loaded with ball, prepared for whatever might happen. On entering the city, De Toro and his troops were seen on one side, as if ready to dispute the passage. Carvajal halted his men, and the two parties remained for some time observing each other with mutual distrust. At length, as neither side seemed inclined to commence hostilities, both parties broke their ranks, and intermingled as friends.
Carvajal was exceedingly irritated against De Toro for his conduct on this occasion, but dissembled till he had entered into Cuzco, where he was received in the most honourable manner. A few days afterwards, he caused four of the principal inhabitants to be arrested, and ordered them to instant execution, without consulting De Toro, or even assigning any reason for this cruel and arbitrary proceeding. Some of those whom he put to death were among the most intimate friends of De Toro, who deemed it prudent and necessary to be silent on the occasion. The unexpected cruelty of Carvajal occasioned much astonishment and consternation among the inhabitants of Cuzco, insomuch that none of them dared to refuse accompanying him on the expedition, and he was enabled to leave Cuzco at the head of three hundred well appointed soldiers with which he marched by Collao in the way towards the province of Las Charcas in search of Centeno. As the latter had a considerably stronger force, it was believed by many that Carvajal would be unsuccessful in this expedition, more especially as most of his followers acted more from force than good will, because he allowed them no pay and treated them with much severity. In his whole conduct and deportment Carvajal acted in a brutal and passionate manner, evincing himself on all occasions the enemy of good men; for he was a bad Christian, constantly addicted to blasphemy, and of a cruel and tyrannical disposition, insomuch that it was generally expected his own people would put him to death to rid themselves of his tyrannous and oppressive conduct. Besides all this, it was obvious to many, that right and justice were on the side of Centeno, who was a man of honour and probity, and, being exceedingly rich, had both the power and inclination to reward his followers. It is necessary to quit Carvajal and his expedition for the present, that we may relate the events which took place at Quito.
We have already mentioned that Gonzalo Pizarro pursued the viceroy from San Miguel to Quito, a distance of 150 leagues or 600 miles, with much perseverance and rapidity, insomuch that almost every day the light armed men belonging to the two armies had opportunities of speaking with each other. During the whole of that long march, neither party had an opportunity to unsaddle their horses. Those belonging to the viceroy, owing to the necessity they were under of escaping from a force so much superior, were even more alert than their pursuers. When at any time they stopped to take a short rest during the night, they slept on the ground in their clothes, holding their horses by the halters, without wasting time in fixing up piquets, or making any of the usual preparations for accommodating themselves and horses during the night. It is true that piquets are seldom used in the sands of Peru for the horses, as it would be necessary to drive these very deep to take sufficient hold; and as there are no trees to be met with in many parts of that country for making piquets, necessity has introduced a substitute in some measure equivalent: For this purpose each horseman has a small bag, which he fills with sand and burries in a hole of sufficient depth, having one end of the halter fixed to the bag, the hole being afterwards filled up and pressed well down to prevent the bag from being drawn up by the efforts of the horse. But on this urgent occasion, the troops of the viceroy did not take time for this measure, but held the halters in their hands, that they might be ready to mount and set out the moment it was necessary by the approach of their pursuers.
In this long march, both the pursuers and the pursued suffered exceedingly from want of provisions; more especially the Pizarrians, as the viceroy used the precaution of removing the curacas and Indians from all the country through which he passed, that his enemy might find every part of the country deserted and unprovided with any means of subsistence. During this precipitate retreat, the viceroy carried along with him eight or ten of the best horses he had been able to procure, which were led by Indians for his own particular use; and when any of these became so tired as to be unable to proceed, he ordered them to be hamstrung, to prevent them from being useful to the enemy. While on this march in pursuit of the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro was joined by Captain Bachicao, who now returned from Tierra Firma with a reinforcement of three hundred and fifty men and a large quantity of artillery, having disembarked, from twenty vessels which he had procured, on a part of the coast as near as possible to Quito, and had made his way in such a manner across the mountains that he got to Quito rather before Gonzalo. On the junction of Bachicao, Gonzalo found himself at the head of more than eight hundred men, among whom were many of the principal people in South America, both townsmen or burgesses, planters, and soldiers. Owing to this large reinforcement, Gonzalo Pizarro found himself in such a state of tranquil security at Quito as hardly any usurper or tyrant had ever before enjoyed; as besides that this province abounded in provisions of every kind, several rich mines of gold had been recently discovered; and as most of the principal people of the province were either now along with the viceroy, or had attached themselves to him while at Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro appropriated all their Indians to himself, employing them in the collection of gold. From the Indians belonging to the treasurer, Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla, he procured about 800 marks17 of gold in the course of eight months; besides that there were other repartimientos of greater value, and that he appropriated all the revenues and rights belonging to the crown, and even pillaged the tombs of the ancient sovereigns of Quito in search of treasure.
17
Eight hundred marks of gold, or 6400 ounces, at L.4 an ounce; are worth L.25,600: and at six for one, the value put upon bullion in those days by the Historian of America, are now worth at least L.153,600, perhaps a quarter of a million. As there were other repartimientos of more value than those of the treasurer, besides others not so valuable, it is not beyond bounds to suppose that Gonzalo may have acquired as much treasure at Quito as was equal to a million of our present money: A prodigious sum, considering that his army did not exceed 800 men; being equal to L.1250 for each soldier.-E.