The departure of De Toro from La-Plata on his return to Cuzco was soon communicated to Centeno by means of the Indians. He was astonished at this sudden alteration of affairs; and, as he understood that De Toro marched in great hast, without keeping his troops in close array, he supposed that circumstance to have been occasioned by De Toro entertaining suspicions of the fidelity of his followers, and that he had found them ill-disposed towards the party of the Pizarrians. On these considerations, Centeno resolved to pursue in his turn, in hope of drawing some advantage to the cause in which he was engaged from this measure, and even expecting that several of the followers of Toro might come over to his side. He sent off therefore the captain Lope de Mendoza with fifty light armed cavalry in pursuit of the enemy. Mendoza got in a short time to Collao; and, although de Toro and most of his troops had already passed beyond that place, he made prisoners of about fifty who remained behind, whom at first he deprived of their horses and arms. Soon afterwards, however, he returned these to his prisoners, and even distributed some money among them, receiving their engagements upon oath to join him when required; but he hanged a few of them who were suspected of being particulary attached to De Toro. After this successful exploit, Lope returned in great haste to La Plata, in hope of being able to cut off Alfonzo de Mendoza and his small party, who still occupied that place. But Alfonzo had received intelligence of what had happened at Collao, and had already quitted La Plata in great haste, taking a different road from that pursued by Lope, by which means he got safe to Cuzco.

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at La Plata with the remainder of his troops, where he assembled all the force under his command, and where he made every possible preparation for continuing the war to advantage, and in particular caused a number of musquets to be made. De Toro continued his retreat to Cuzco, dreading much to be pursued, and lest Centeno might have acquired possession of Cuzco, which he might easily have accomplished in the present situation of affairs; but Centeno thought it more prudent to remain at La Plata, where he augmented the number of his troops and collected treasure which was found in great plenty in the province of Las Charcas.

The events which had taken place in Las Charcas were soon known at Lima; and as several of the soldiers in that city were attached to the party of the viceroy, they spoke almost openly of going away to join Centeno; and, from the small attention paid by Lorenzo de Aldana to repress these men, he was even suspected of favouring the same cause. Antonio de Ribera likewise, although the brother-in-law of Pizarro, was strongly suspected of being secretly devoted to the royal interest, as indeed his conduct in the sequel evinced; and several other persons of consideration lay under suspicions of the same nature. All this gave much uneasiness to the friends of Pizarro: Yet those persons at Lima who wished well to the interests of his majesty, did not think it prudent at this time to make any open attempt, being satisfied that it was better to wait a more favourable opportunity, and that De Aldana would prepare matters for that purpose, as he seemed clearly favourable to the same cause. His abilities were universally acknowledged, and his good intentions were not doubted, so that all were satisfied that he would conduct matters with much prudence to a favourable issue.

At this time it became known at Lima that the viceroy had retreated with a small body of troops into the province of Popayan; and that during his retreat he had put to death several of the officers and other persons of consideration in his army; among whom were Rodrigo de Ocampo, Jerom de la Cerna, Gaspard Gil Olivarez and Gomez Estacio; some of these because they were inclined to abandon him, and others for corresponding with Gonzalo Pizarro, and conspiring to put the viceroy to death. On the communication of this intelligence at Lima, it produced different effects according to the different inclinations and views of the inhabitants. It occasioned more reserve among those who were of loyal dispositions; whereas the partizans of the Pizarrian tyranny considered themselves more at liberty to avow their sentiments to Aldana. They went therefore to him in a body, and represented that there were many persons in Lima who were strongly suspected of being hostile to Gonzalo Pizarro, and only waited a favourable opportunity to take up arms against him; and that it was incumbent therefore on the lieutenant governor to punish these men for the scandalous freedoms in which they had indulged, or at least to banish them from the city. They offered to furnish sufficient proof of these facts, and urged him to exert his authority on the occasion. Aldana assured them that none of these things had ever come to his knowledge; and that if he knew who those were against whom they complained, he would take such measures as were necessary on the occasion.

The partizans of Pizarro became at length so bold that they arrested fifteen of those whom they most strongly suspected of attachment to the deposed viceroy, among whom was Diego Lopez de Zuniga. Having thrown these men into prison, the Pizarrians were inclined to have given them the torture to extort confession, and afterwards to have procured their condemnation by Pedro Martin the provost marshal of the city; so that they were in imminent danger of being put to death, if Lorenzo de Aldana had not exerted himself promptly and effectually to take them out of the hands of the Pizarrians. For this purpose, he caused them all to be brought to his own residence, on pretence that they would be there in more safe custody, and provided them with every thing of which they stood in need, even secretly furnishing them with a vessel in which they embarked and saved themselves from their enemies. This transaction gave much dissatisfaction to the friends of Pizarro, both on account of the escape of the prisoners, and because Aldana refused to allow of any formal investigation into the circumstances of their escape; on which account the Pizarrians firmly believed that Aldana was in secret league with the opposite party. They wrote therefore to Gonzalo Pizarro, giving him an account of all these events, and urging him to give proper orders on the occasion. But Gonzalo did not think it prudent at this time to make any change in affairs at Lima, or to attempt any thing against Aldana; because, as it has been reported, he was afraid of matters taking an unfavourable issue while he was at so great a distance.

When Gonzalo Pizarro was informed of what had been done by Centeno in the province of Las Charcas against his interest and authority, he believed it necessary to use prompt measures for reducing that country to subjection, and not to give his enemies time and opportunity for strengthening themselves and increasing the number of their partizans; as he flattered himself that he would become absolute master of the whole kingdom of Peru, if he were able to get rid of Centeno. After several consultations with the principal officers of his army, on the measures necessary to be pursued on this emergency, in which Gonzalo could not act in person as he had still to oppose the viceroy in the north, it was determined to confide the care of an expedition against Centeno to the lieutenant-general Carvajal. For this purpose all the necessary orders and commissions were made out immediately in the name of Gonzalo Pizarro, by which Carvajal was authorized to levy what men and money he might deem necessary. This employment was very acceptable to Carvajal, as he believed he might derive considerable profit to himself in its execution; and he set out from Quito accompanied only by twenty persons, in whom he had great confidence. The council of Gonzalo Pizarro had other and secret motives for recommending the employment of Carvajal on this occasion, besides those which they publickly avowed. Some were desirous of acquiring by his absence a greater share in the management of affairs; while others were anxious to send him to a distance, from the terror inspired by his cruel and ferocious conduct, and his passionate temper, owing to which he used often to put people to death on the most trifling offences or the slightest suspicions. But all the leaders in the army disguised their real sentiments on this occasion, pretending that the importance of the affair required the talents and experience of Carvajal to bring it to a successful issue.