So who is our 6% coming out of? If the founders end up net ahead it's not coming out of them. So is it coming out of later stage investors? Well, they do end up paying more. But I think they pay more because the company is actually more valuable. And later stage investors have no problem with that. The returns of a VC fund depend on the quality of the companies they invest in, not how cheaply they can buy stock in them.
If what we do is useful, why wasn't anyone doing it before? There are two answers to that. One is that people were doing it before, just haphazardly on a smaller scale. Before us, seed funding came primarily from individual angel investors. Larry and Sergey, for example, got their seed funding from Andy Bechtolsheim, one of the founders of Sun. And because he was a startup guy he probably gave them useful advice. But raising money from angel investors is a hit or miss thing. It's a sideline for most of them, so they only do a handful of deals a year and they don't spend a lot of time on the startups they invest in. And they're hard to reach, because they don't want random startups pestering them with business plans. The Google guys were lucky because they knew someone who knew Bechtolsheim. It generally takes a personal introduction with angels.
The other reason no one was doing quite what we do is that till recently it was a lot more expensive to start a startup. You'll notice we haven't funded any biotech startups. That's still expensive. But advancing technology has made web startups so cheap that you really can get a company airborne for $15,000. If you understand how to operate a steam catapult, at least.
So in effect what's happened is that a new ecological niche has opened up, and Y Combinator is the new kind of animal that has moved into it. We're not a replacement for venture capital funds. We occupy a new, adjacent niche. And conditions in our niche are really quite different. It's not just that the problems we face are different; the whole structure of the business is different. VCs are playing a zero-sum game. They're all competing for a slice of a fixed amount of "deal flow," and that explains a lot of their behavior. Whereas our m.o. is to create new deal flow, by encouraging hackers who would have gotten jobs to start their own startups instead. We compete more with employers than VCs.
It's not surprising something like this would happen. Most fields become more specialized—more articulated—as they develop, and startups are certainly an area in which there has been a lot of development over the past couple decades. The venture business in its present form is only about forty years old. It stands to reason it would evolve.
And it's natural that the new niche would at first be described, even by its inhabitants, in terms of the old one. But really Y Combinator is not in the startup funding business. Really we're more of a small, furry steam catapult.
You Weren't Meant to Have a Boss
A few days ago I was sitting in a cafe in Palo Alto and a group of programmers came in on some kind of scavenger hunt. It was obviously one of those corporate "team-building" exercises.
They looked familiar. I spend nearly all my time working with programmers in their twenties and early thirties. But something seemed wrong about these. There was something missing.
And yet the company they worked for is considered a good one, and from what I overheard of their conversation, they seemed smart enough. In fact, they seemed to be from one of the more prestigious groups within the company.
So why did it seem there was something odd about them?
I have a uniquely warped perspective, because nearly all the programmers I know are startup founders. We've now funded 80 startups with a total of about 200 founders, nearly all of them programmers. I spend a lot of time with them, and not much with other programmers. So my mental image of a young programmer is a startup founder.
The guys on the scavenger hunt looked like the programmers I was used to, but they were employees instead of founders. And it was startling how different they seemed.
So what, you may say. So I happen to know a subset of programmers who are especially ambitious. Of course less ambitious people will seem different. But the difference between the programmers I saw in the cafe and the ones I was used to wasn't just a difference of degree. Something seemed wrong.
I think it's not so much that there's something special about founders as that there's something missing in the lives of employees. I think startup founders, though statistically outliers, are actually living in a way that's more natural for humans.
I was in Africa last year and saw a lot of animals in the wild that I'd only seen in zoos before. It was remarkable how different they seemed. Particularly lions. Lions in the wild seem about ten times more alive. They're like different animals. And seeing those guys on their scavenger hunt was like seeing lions in a zoo after spending several years watching them in the wild.
What's so unnatural about working for a big company? The root of the problem is that humans weren't meant to work in such large groups.
Another thing you notice when you see animals in the wild is that each species thrives in groups of a certain size. A herd of impalas might have 100 adults; baboons maybe 20; lions rarely 10. Humans also seem designed to work in groups, and what I've read about hunter-gatherers accords with research on organizations and my own experience to suggest roughly what the ideal size is: groups of 8 work well; by 20 they're getting hard to manage; and a group of 50 is really unwieldy. [1]
Whatever the upper limit is, we are clearly not meant to work in groups of several hundred. And yet—for reasons having more to do with technology than human nature—a great many people work for companies with hundreds or thousands of employees.
Companies know groups that large wouldn't work, so they divide themselves into units small enough to work together. But to coordinate these they have to introduce something new: bosses.
These smaller groups are always arranged in a tree structure. Your boss is the point where your group attaches to the tree. But when you use this trick for dividing a large group into smaller ones, something strange happens that I've never heard anyone mention explicitly. In the group one level up from yours, your boss represents your entire group. A group of 10 managers is not merely a group of 10 people working together in the usual way. It's really a group of groups. Which means for a group of 10 managers to work together as if they were simply a group of 10 individuals, the group working for each manager would have to work as if they were a single person—the workers and manager would each share only one person's worth of freedom between them.
In practice a group of people never manage to act as if they were one person. But in a large organization divided into groups in this way, the pressure is always in that direction. Each group tries its best to work as if it were the small group of individuals that humans were designed to work in. That was the point of creating it. And when you propagate that constraint, the result is that each person gets freedom of action in inverse proportion to the size of the entire tree. [2]
Anyone who's worked for a large organization has felt this. You can feel the difference between working for a company with 100 employees and one with 10,000, even if your group has only 10 people.
A group of 10 people within a large organization is a kind of fake tribe. The number of people you interact with is about right. But something is missing: individual initiative. Tribes of hunter-gatherers have more freedom. The leaders have a little more power than other members of the tribe, but they don't generally tell them what to do and when the way a boss can.